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Section 57-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve 
church property disputes.  There is, however, a significant amount of 
controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of 
hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the 
ecclesiastical thicket.  Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the 
controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of 
substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church 
property disputes.  Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an 
ecclesiastical crisis.  The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division 
within the Episcopal Church’s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church 
property litigation that ensued following the division. 
 
This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various 
courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and 
provides a specific analysis of Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so. 
Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts 
have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property 
disputes.  Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization’s 
adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach.  
Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such 
as property law or contact law.  Finally, states may enact special statutes to 
direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues 
that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving  
church property disputes within the Supreme Court’s established framework 
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for doing so.  Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 57-
9(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path 
leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On a national and international scale—perhaps more so now than ever—
religious organizations are wrestling with difficult doctrinal questions 
relating to abortion, homosexual marriage, and the willingness to ordain 
homosexual ministers.1  Many religious bodies are starting to reconsider 
their positions on these controversial matters.  Several denominations have 
shifted, if not completely reversed, their positions on these issues to the 
great satisfaction of some and the great dismay of others.
2
  Indeed, the 
country is facing an ecclesiastical crisis.  This crisis hails the reemergence 
of a legal issue that managed largely to disappear into the backdrop for 
generations: church property disputes. 
A significant number of churches receive the majority of their funding to 
maintain and improve church property from the donations of its members.
3
  
When those members disagree on significant issues of doctrine, the result 
can be an internal schism within the church.  Members sharing the same 
perspective on a particular issue form opposing factions that wish to operate 
independently of those members that maintain the opposite perspective.
4
  
The question remains, however, as to which faction is entitled to possess 
and use church property that has been funded by members of both factions.
5
  
While the dispute amongst factions may sometimes be resolved by a 
religious institution’s own internal tribunals, factions may also seek relief 
 
1. Compare Jane Lampman, A Church’s Struggle Over Gay Marriage, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jul. 1, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0701/p02s01-ussc.html (noting that 
mainline denominations take a strong position against gay marriage and leave the decision to individual 
churches on whether or not to adopt the position), with Matt Slick, Christianity and Homosexuality, 
CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS & RESEARCH MINISTRY, http://carm.org/christianity-and-homosexuality 
(advocating that Christians become more tolerant of homosexuality). 
2. See SAMUEL KORANTENG-PIPIM, MUST WE BE SILENT? ISSUES DIVIDING OUR CHURCH, available at 
http://www.drpipim.org/homosexuality-contemporaryissues-47/73-why-attitudes-are-changing-on-
homosexuality-part-1.html (2001) (noting the changing attitudes on homosexuality by various 
churches); see also Robert Nugent, The U.S. Catholic Bishops and Gay Civil Rights: Four Case Studies, 
38 CATH. LAW 1 (1998). 
3. John C. LaRue, Jr., Church Budgets and Income, YOUR CHURCH, Sept. 1, 2001, available at 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/yc/2000/sepoct/12.128.html (stating that “the typical church counts on 
tithes and offerings for 93 percent of its budget” and “[c]hurches with budgets greater than $500,000 
depend less on tithes and offerings (87[percent] of income) than the average church”). 
4. See Ann Rodgers, Episcopal Gay Bishops Decision Compounds Activists, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Jul. 16, 2009, at A4; Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Methodists Propose Schisms Over Gay 
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A20; Associated Press, Episcopalians Meet to Discuss a Possible 
Split, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at 116; Don Lattin, California Episcopal Churches Split Over Gay 
Marriage, S.F. GATE (Aug. 6, 2003), http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-08-06/news/17504436_1_gay-
bishop-episcopal-diocese-anglican-communion. 
5. See Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and Coercion in Church Property Litigation, 96 VA. L. 
REV. 443 (2010); Dan Dalton, Who Owns Church Property? (Apr. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.attorneysforlanduse.com/pdfs/who%20owns%20church%20property.pdf. 
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from civil courts.
6
  In doing so, they place the judiciary in the center of a 
doctrinal crossfire where courts are left to resolve the legal aspects of the 
property dispute while avoiding the ecclesiastical questions that are 
necessarily attached to the dispute. 
A recent example of the current ecclesiastical crisis can be seen in the 
Episcopal Church.  In 2003, the highest governing body of the church 
passed one resolution ordaining a noncelibate homosexual as a minister and 
another resolution endorsing homosexual marriage.
7
  These actions resulted 
in a nationwide schism within the church in which thousands of members 
permanently departed from Episcopalian fellowship,
8
 and consequently, 
disputes over church property erupted in numerous states, including 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, and Virginia.
9
  With an increasing 
percentage of the United States population shifting away from conservative 
values and other mainstream denominations reconsidering their traditional 
positions on issues such as homosexual marriage and ordainment of 
homosexual ministers,
10
 it is likely that courts will be faced with an 
increasing amount of church property litigation.
11
 
Recently, Virginia took center stage in the Episcopal Church’s property 
disputes.
12
  Several local parishes within the Commonwealth attempted to 
separate themselves from the Episcopal Church while retaining possession 
of their congregational property.
13
  The case formed the “perfect storm” of 
 
6. Meghaan Cecilia McElroy, Note, Possession is Nine Tenths of the Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
311, 313 (2008). 
7. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Va. v. Truro Church (Truro), 280 Va. 6, 15, 694 S.E.2d 
555, 559 (2010). 
8. Id.; see also Michelle Boorstein & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Diocese Sues 11 Seceding Congregations 
Over Property Ownership, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at B4. 
9. See Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 305 Ga. App. 87, 699 
S.E.2d 45 (2010) (local parish sought to disaffiliate from national church, and national church brought 
action to retain control of church property); Casa De Oracion, Church of God Prophecy v. Carrasco, 
Nos. H034092, H034193, 2010 WL 1820438 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2010) (San Jose church members 
sought to remove the treasurer and trustee of the church and gain sole right to control and possess the 
church's property); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 630, 2010 
WL 1497141 (2010) (although parish property was held in trust for the diocese, parish members refused 
to relinquish church property after defecting from the church); Truro, 280 Va. 6, 694 S.E.2d 555 (2010) 
(Episcopalian congregation, formerly affiliated with first diocese, brought action to determine property 
rights following alleged division of church). 
10. See Lampman, supra note 1. 
11. See George Conger, No break in pace of Episcopal Church lawsuits: The Church of England 
Newspaper, August 6, 2010 p 6, GEOCONGER (Aug. 9, 2010),  
http://geoconger.wordpress.com/2010/08/09/no-break-in-pace-of-episcopal-church-lawsuits-the-church-
of-england-newspaper-august-6-2010-p-6; Lampman, supra note 1. 
12. Mary Frances Schjonberg, Virginia: Court Ruling Clears Way for Property-Litigation, EPISCOPAL 
NEWS SERV. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/81803_103915_ENG_HTM.htm. 
13. Id. 
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church property disputes because it involved a dated Virginia statute 
purporting to resolve the issue, a unique set of facts underlying the case, 
and national attention surrounding the litigation and the controversial issues 
at play.  Accordingly, the recent church property litigation in Virginia offers 
the ideal case study to demonstrate why the issue of church property 
disputes is more relevant now than ever before. 
This article revisits the question of what a court may and may not do to 
resolve these disputes without violating the Establishment or Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment.  Although the problem is one of national 
scope, this article will primarily focus on the law within the Commonwealth 
of Virginia and the recent legal developments to that law as a result of the 
recent nationwide rupture in the Episcopal Church.  Part I discusses 
Supreme Court treatment of church property disputes and summarizes the 
constitutional requirements applicable in these disputes.  Part II explains the 
impact of the ecclesiastical crisis on Virginia and recent developments to 
Virginia law.  Part III demonstrates how Virginia’s statutory framework 
governing church property disputes places Virginia courts on the road for 
an ecclesiastical collision.  Part IV presents conclusions as to the future of 
church property dispute law in Virginia and what changes the law will 
undergo in the wake of an impending ecclesiastical collision. 
I.  DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS FOR RESOLVING ECCLESIASTICAL CRISES 
This section will discuss prior Supreme Court of the United States 
treatment of church property disputes related to constitutional law.  The 
constitutional scope of permissible state action in relation to the church 
property developed over the course of several Supreme Court cases.  
Accordingly, prior to discussing the historical development of First 
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the issue, it is essential to 
understand the current status of the law.
14
  The clearest guiding principle in 
this relatively undefined area of the law is that a court may not resolve a 
religious property dispute on the basis of religious practice or doctrine.
15
  
States have their choice of several options in attempting to approach these 
disputes: (a) deferring to the resolution of the dispute as decided by the 
religious organization’s adjudicatory body; (b) deciding the case on the 
basis of a neutral principle of law; or (c) enacting legislation that 
 
14. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church 
(Presbyterian Church), 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
15. Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Md. & Va. Churches Eldership 
of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg Church (Churches of God), 396 U.S. 367, 368 
(1970); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449. 
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specifically directs the courts how to resolve church property disputes.
16
  
The Supreme Court has held that one method is generally not preferred over 
the other unless a court’s reliance on a particular neutral principle of law 
would require it to resolve ecclesiastical questions.
 17
  In such a situation, 
the First Amendment requires that “civil courts defer to the resolution of 
issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical 
church organization.”
18
  The path taken by the Court in shaping these 
constitutional doctrines governing state action in resolving church property 
disputes is set forth below. 
Originally, American courts relied on the English common law rule to 
resolve church property disputes.
19
  That rule, known as “implied trust 
theory,” provided that a hierarchical church maintains the right to control 
the church property being utilized by local member churches.
20
  
Specifically, courts implied a trust between a local church and its parent 
organization in which the local church held the church property in trust for 
the parent organization.
21
  Implied trust theory also provided protection for 
local churches in the scenario where doctrinal shifts of the parent 
organization resulted in members of a local church seeking to disaffiliate 
from the parent organization while still maintaining possession of church 
property.  A local church facing such a situation could argue the “departure 
from doctrine” element of implied trust theory.
22
  Essentially, the local 
 
16. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
17. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). 
18. Serb. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724–25. 
19. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 445. 
20. See Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious 
Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 559 (1990) (“In place of a finding of actual intent to create a 
trust in favor of the hierarchy, courts have relied primarily on the concept of implied consent to the 
hierarchy's rules.”); Notes, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 
HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1145–49 (1962) (discussing the English origins and early case law of the implied-
trust doctrine). Contra Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (rejecting the implied trust doctrine). 
21. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (noting how previously English courts had been willing to decide which of 
the contending parties adhered to the true standard of faith in the church organization); Judicial 
Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1151  (“Many courts thus 
declared that church property no matter how obtained was impressed with a trust for the maintenance of 
the forms of ecclesiastical government to which the founders had adhered.”) (citing First Constitutional 
Presbyterian Church v. Congregational Soc'y, 23 Iowa 567 (1867); Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492 (N.Y. 
1845); Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches of St. John's & St. Peter's, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439 (N.Y. 1844); Roshi's 
Appeal, 69 Pa. 462 (1871); Sutter v. Trustees of the First Reformed Dutch Church, 42 Pa. 503 (1862)); 
see also John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the Church?, 9 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 319, 320 (1997) (noting that in cases involving hierarchical or congregational 
churches, “a sound view rooted in our perception of church and state relations would require courts to 
accept, as final and binding, those decisions pertaining to religious matters made by the church's highest 
authority”). 
22. See Craigdallie v. Aikman, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820) (resolving a property dispute between factions 
of a Scottish congregation by holding that unless otherwise agreed, the faction espousing the original 
founding principles of the group is entitled to the property); H. Reese Hansen, Religious Organizations 
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church would bring a judicial action alleging that the parent church 
significantly deviated from the fundamental tenets of the particular faith, as 
they were understood at the time the local church affiliated with it.
23
  The 
court would then examine the doctrinal positions of the local church as 
opposed to the parent organization, determine which position most closely 
aligned with the traditional tenets of the faith, and terminate the implied 
trust between the local church and parent church if the parent church had 
substantially departed from doctrinal beliefs as they existed at the time that 
the local parish affiliated with the parent organization.
24
  Accordingly, a 
successful challenge in this manner enabled the local church to withdraw 
from the parent church while retaining control of the property that it had 
previously held in trust for the parent church. 
25
 
The Supreme Court formed an alternative method of resolving church 
property disputes in the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones.
26
  In Watson, 
members of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church were divided over 
which members constituted the elders of the church,
27
 and they ultimately 
formed two factions—each faction claiming it was lawfully entitled to 
control the church property.
28
  The Supreme Court did not rely on implied 
trust theory to resolve the dispute, but instead crafted a new rule known as 
the “deference rule.”29  Under that rule, a court must defer to decisions of a 
church’s internal governing structure “whenever the questions of discipline, 
or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the 
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.”
30
  
 
and the Law of Trusts, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 288 (James A. Serritella et 
al. eds., 2006) (discussing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 
Inc., 241 A.2d 691, 700–01 (Md. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969), decree aff'd, 254 
A.2d 162 (Md. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367, 367–68 (1970) (per curiam)); Jeffrey B. Hassler, 
Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property 
Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 408–10 (2008); see 
also Fiona McCarthy, Church Property and Institutional Free Exercise: The Constitutionality of 
Virginia Code Section 57-9, 95 VA. L. REV. 1841, 1863 (2009). 
23. See Hansen, supra note 22, at 286. 
24. Id.; Fennelly, supra note 21, at 320. 
25. Fennelly, supra note 21, at 320. 
26. 80 U.S. 679 (1871). 
27. Id. at 717. 
28. Id. at 717–18. 
29. Id. at 727, 734–35. 
30. Id. at 727.  It is important to note, however, that the deference approach only applies to hierarchical 
churches because congregational churches do not have a higher adjudicatory body to turn to for making 
binding determinations as to the status of the property.  See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the 
Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1157–58.  A church is considered a hierarchical church if the 
religious organization holding the property is a subordinate member of some general church 
organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of 
control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory of discipline over the whole membership of 
that general organization.  Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Va. v. Truro Church (Truro), 280 
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Accordingly, following Watson, courts were left with two approaches to 
managing church property disputes: (a) the implied trust theory and (b) the 
deference approach.
31
 
The Court made further developments to First Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding church property disputes law in Presbyterian Church in the 
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church 
(“Presbyterian Church”).
32
  The issue in Presbyterian Church involved the 
constitutionality of the English common law approach to church property 
disputes—implied trust theory.
33
  In that case, the Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull 
Memorial Church (“Hull Church”) separated from its parent religious 
organization, and a dispute arose between the two as to the ownership of the 
Hull Church and its associated property.
34
  Applying the implied trust 
theory and the “departure from doctrine” test, the Supreme Court of 
Georgia awarded the property to the local congregation.35  However, the 
Supreme Court of the United States struck down implied trust theory as 
unconstitutional.
36
  Specifically, it explained that the “departure from 
 
Va. 6, 13, 694 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2010) (citing Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26 
(1967) (explaining that Virginia Code section 57-9 applies to congregations of hierarchical churches)).  
The Watson case was not decided on constitutional grounds.  See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over 
the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1156 (“To be sure, Watson is not a constitutional decision. 
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was only a few years old, and it would be many more years before 
guarantees in the [F]irst [A]mendment would be deemed operative against state action by virtue of the 
due process clause.”).  However, the deference rule articulated in Watson was revisited in Kedroff v. St. 
Nichols Cathedral.  344 U.S. 94 (1952).  This case involved two different archbishops that claimed a 
right to use the church property at issue.  Id. at 96.  The Court declared the New York statute 
unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 120–21.  It applied the 
deference rule articulated in Watson and explained that deferring to a church’s internal ruling 
“necessarily follows in order that there may be free exercise of religion” under the Constitution.  Id. at 
121. 
31. 80 U.S. at 725 (noting that the Supreme Court decided to follow the deference approach without 
absolutely rejecting the English theory of implied trust); Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use 
of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1157–58 (“[W]hile most state courts professed adherence to 
Watson, and while judicial interference with hierarchically organized churches decreased markedly after 
Watson, the implied-trust doctrine persisted in most states principally in connection with 
congregationally governed churches.”  Id. 
32. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).  But see Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69, 78 (1972) (leaving open the 
possibility that the implied trust theory could be applied on some other basis).  The case involved two 
local Presbyterian churches that voted to withdraw from the parent church and become an autonomous 
Presbyterian body.  Id. at 71.  The local churches maintained that the various theological, political, and 
administrative actions and declarations by the parent church constituted a departure from the 
fundamental tenets of faith, a violation of the church constitution. Subsequently, the parent church 
attempted to regain control over the property being used by the local churches.  Id. at 81.  Rather than 
make use of the internal appellate procedures with the church governance system, the churches filed suit 
seeking to enjoin the parent church from trespassing on the properties.  Id. at 71, 81.  The local churches 
prevailed at the lower level based on the implied trust theory.  Id. at 72. 
33. 393 U.S. at 443–44. 
34. Id. at. 442–43. 
35. Id. at 443–44. 
36. Id. at 449–51. 
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doctrine” element of implied trust theory violated the First Amendment 
mandate that civil courts refrain from making any decision regarding the 
ownership status of church property rights when that decision involved 
interpretation of church doctrine.
37
  It further added that the internal 
governing authorities of a religious entity are the appropriate arbitrators in 
matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance,” and civil courts cannot be called up 
to resolve a dispute when the very nature of the dispute implicates 
ecclesiastical questions.38 To rely on the courts to resolve such questions 
would run directly afoul of the Establishment Clause.
39
 
Although the Court seized the opportunity in Presbyterian Church to 
eliminate one possible approach for resolving church property disputes, it 
also crafted a second alternative for courts to handle such litigation.  Indeed, 
states needed another option because the only remaining approach after the 
abolishment of implied trust theory—the deference approach—could only 
be applied if the parties belonged to a religious organization that maintained 
an adjudicatory body to resolve property disputes between its members.  
Accordingly, if the parties of a church property dispute were members of a 
church that did not have such an adjudicatory body, a court would be left 
without an established legal principle to decide the dispute.  The Court, 
presumably sensitive to this dilemma, preempted the problem by explaining 
that its holding was not to be construed as requiring courts to close their 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 446–47.  The Court reaffirmed this position in Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich.  426 
U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976).  In that case, Milivojevich acted as the bishop over the general church, and the 
trial court concluded that the members of the church incorrectly removed him from office and appointed 
a different bishop to replace him.  Id. at 697–98.  In justifying its holding, the Court mentioned a 
previous Supreme Court decision that indicated that a civil court may not have to show deference to the 
decisions of religious governing bodies if the decision was made in a fraudulent, collusive, or arbitrary 
manner.  Id. at 712.  On review, the Supreme Court rejected that arbitrariness was a valid exception to 
the deference doctrine.  Id. at 712, 734.  The majority went on to explain that application of an 
arbitrariness exception impermissibly required judicial “inquiry into the procedures that canon or 
ecclesiastical law supposedly require the church judicatory to follow or else into the substantive criteria 
by which they supposedly [are] to decide the ecclesiastical question.”  Id. at 713.  To do so “would 
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, 
and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.”  Id. 
39. 393 U.S. at 451–52.  The church property dispute cases decided by the Supreme Court at the time of 
the neutral principles doctrine serve as a precursor to the probation on excessive government 
entanglement with religion.  At the risk of dramatically understating the current state of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, one approach to testing whether a government action violates the 
Establishment Clause is the three-part analysis articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman.  403 U.S. 
602 (1971).  Under the Lemon test, government action violates the Establishment Clause, unless: (a) 
there is a legitimate secular purpose for taking the action, (b) the primary effect of the action is to neither 
inhibit nor advance religion, and (c) the action does not foster excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.  Id. at 615.  Although a court would likely couch a decision regarding a church 
property dispute in terms of the “neutral principles” doctrine, the doctrine appears to be very similar to 
the concept of excessive entanglement. 
  
518 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIV:401 
doors to religious bodies seeking adjudication of property disputes.
40
  
Rather courts could decide such disputes on the basis of neutral principles 
of law—principles applicable in any property dispute—without judicially 
establishing churches in violation of the First Amendment.
41
 
The Court made clear in Presbyterian Church that states could resolve 
church property disputes by either deferring to the internal adjudicatory 
bodies of the church or by applying neutral principles of law; however, it 
left unanswered the question of whether one approach should be applied to 
a dispute before considering the other.
42
  In other words, in a situation 
where a church property dispute arose and the church’s judicatory rendered 
a decision purporting to resolve the dispute, were the courts required to 
defer to that decision where neutral principles of law commanded a contrary 
outcome?
43
 
The Court clarified the answer to this question in Jones v. Wolf,
44
 where 
the majority faction of a divided, local church sought to disaffiliate the 
church from its parent denomination.
45
  The denomination’s judicatory 
made a formal decision that the minority faction of the church—the faction 
that sought to remain aligned with the denomination—was the rightful 
owner of the property.
46
  The minority faction argued that the trial court was 
required to defer to the decision of the denomination’s judicatory.
47
  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected this 
argument, explaining that “a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt 
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating church property 
disputes” and is not required to apply the deference approach in lieu of 
neutral principles when confronted with a decision between the two.
48
  The 
Court then, however, added a caveat to this rule.
49
  A court may only choose 
 
40. 403 U.S. at 625; see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (noting that there can be no 
question that the constitutionally protected religious autonomy concerning “matters of church 
government” encompass a church’s freedom to adopt and demand civil court enforcement of its own 
rules of property ownership). 
41. 393 U.S. at 449, 451–52. 
42. Id. at 449; Kenneth E. North, Church Property Disputes: A Constitutional Perspective (2000), 
reprinted in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW: THEOLOGICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS app. C, at 209 (Lloyd J. Lunceford ed., 2006) (discussing the issue in Jones v. Wolf of 
whether a court may forgo the deference test and apply neutral principles of state law). 
43. See North, supra note 42, at 209. 
44. 443 U.S. 595 (1979). 
45. Id.  The majority faction brought suit, and the trial court found for the majority faction on the basis 
of neutral principles of law.  Id. at 599. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 604. 
49. Id. 
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to resolve a dispute applying neutral principles of law if applying those 
principles would not require the court to decide ecclesiastical questions.
50
  
If a court must resolve ecclesiastical questions to apply the neutral 
principles doctrine, it must “defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by 
the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”
51
 
A third constitutional alternative for government resolution of church 
property disputes likely exists in the form of courts applying legislation that 
specifically governs such disputes.
52
  In other words, state legislatures may 
enact statutes that guide the outcome of a religious property dispute so long 
as the statute operates in a manner that avoids state involvement in religious 
doctrine.
53
  The precedential basis for this third option is found in Justice 
Brennan’s concurring opinion in Churches of God.
54
  While it does not 
appear that the Court has expressly endorsed special statutes as a third 
alternative approach, the Churches of God Court seemingly adopted the 
reasoning from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Jones by quoting it in its 
ruling.
55
  Specifically, the Court’s holding relied on Justice Brennan’s 
argument that “a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling 
church property disputes,” but stopped short of quoting his language that 
categorized special statutes as their own separate approach to resolving 
church property disputes.
56
  This omission notwithstanding, the context of 
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in referencing “various approaches” 
included states adopting special statutes.
57
  Thus, the Court’s use of Justice 
Brennan’s concurrence in Jones seemingly lends support to the conclusion 
 
50. Id. 
51. Id. (noting that if the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to 
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must “defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the 
authoritative ecclesiastical body” (citing Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 
(1976))); see also Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union 
First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 88 (3rd Cir. 1996) (discussing Churches of God, 
396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970), indicating there are only two approaches to resolving church property 
disputes). 
52. Some commentators argue that the deference approach and the neutral principles doctrine are the 
only two methods available to civil courts to resolve church property disputes.  See Justin M. Gardner, 
Note, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical Denominations and the Resulting Custody Battle Over 
Church Property: How the Supreme Court Has Needlessly Rendered Church Property Trust Ineffectual, 
6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 245 (2007) (stating that “as the matter currently stands, the civil courts have 
two permissible methods of adjudicating church property disputes”—neutral principles of law and the 
deference approach). 
53. Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also In re Episcopal 
Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 492, 198 P.3d 66, 83 (2009) (approving of the statute because it leaves 
control of ecclesiastical policy and doctrine to the church). 
54. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
55. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) 
(Brennan, J., concurring)). 
56. Id. 
57. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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that the Court recognizes the constitutional validity of statutes designed 
specifically to resolve church property disputes.  However, it remains 
unsettled whether the Court considers these “special statutes” to be their 
own separate category of resolving church property disputes or merely a 
subcategory of the broader doctrine of “neutral principles of law.”58 
One possible reading of the Court’s use of Justice Brennan’s Jones 
concurrence is that, in referencing his discussion of the various approaches 
available to the states for resolving church property disputes, it adopted his 
categorization of those approaches.  According to Justice Brennan, special 
statutes were an entirely separate approach to resolving church property 
disputes than “neutral principles of law.”
59
  This categorization makes sense 
given that neutral principles of law are supposed to be principles applicable 
in any property dispute and a statute specifically targeting religious 
institutions would not be applicable in disputes not involving such 
institutions.  Courts, however, have read Jones as considering special 
statutes merely one type of neutral principle of law that a state may rely on 
in resolving church property disputes.  As one court explained: 
A statute governing specifically church property obviously is not developed for 
use in all property disputes, but, as the high court has made clear, it may still be 
considered in applying neutral principles of law as that court defines the term.  
Such a statute is-or must be-neutral in the sense that it does not require state 
courts to resolve questions of religious doctrine.
60
 
Indeed, when resolving church property disputes, it remains unsettled 
how courts should reconcile Justice Brennan’s categorization of special 
statutes as a wholly separate approach from neutral principles of law with 
the Jones analysis, which indicates that a special statute is a neutral 
principle of law.  The Supreme Court of Colorado commented on this issue, 
noting: 
Justice Brennan identified a third approach-the passage of special statutes 
governing church property arrangements in a manner that precludes state  
interference in doctrine.  Since the neutral principles approach involves, among 
other things, an analysis of relevant state statutes, it is not clear how this third 
alternative differs from a neutral principles analysis.
61
 
 
 
58. Compare In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 481 n.4, 198 P.3d 66, 76 n.4 (2009), with 
Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986). 
59. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“Neutral principles of law, developed 
for use in all property disputes, provide another means for resolving litigation over religious property” 
and another “approach is the passage of special statutes governing church property arrangements in a 
manner that precludes state interference in doctrine.”) (citations omitted). 
60. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 481 n.4, 198 P.3d at 76 n.4. 
61. Bishop & Diocese of Colo., 716 P.2d at 91 n.6. 
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Ultimately, although the question whether special statutes are an entirely 
separate approach from neutral principles of law remains unclear, it is clear 
that “such statutes must be carefully drawn to leave control of ecclesiastical 
polity, as well as doctrine, to church governing bodies.”
62
 
In summary, there are two definite approaches courts may pursue to 
resolve church property disputes that do not offend the First Amendment: 
(1) a court may resolve church property disputes by deferring to the highest 
deciding body in a church’s internal governance so long as doing so does 
not require the court to resolve ecclesiastical questions; or (2) a court may 
resolve church property disputes by applying neutral principles of law—
those principles of law that are applicable in any property dispute and do 
not require the court to resolve any ecclesiastical issues underlying the 
property dispute.  There is some confusion as to whether there is a third 
approach available in the form of special statutes allowing courts to resolve 
church property disputes without deciding ecclesiastical questions or 
whether such statutes are merely a subcategory of neutral principles of 
law.63  Although states are not under a general obligation to apply any 
particular approach of these three options in favor of another,
64
 the 
deference approach must be applied where relying on neutral principles of 
law would require the court to resolve ecclesiastical questions.65  
Furthermore, if special statutes are categorically different from neutral 
principles of law, such statutes manifest state legislatures’ intent to resolve 
church property disputes in a particular way and, accordingly, courts should 
attempt to apply such statutes before considering either the neutral 
principles approach or the deference approach.
66
  As will be shown in the 
next section, however, determining when such statutes are applicable is—
and will continue to be—the subject of significant litigation. 
II. RECENT ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS IN VIRGINIA 
The ecclesiastical crisis recently found its way into the Virginia courts.  
In many ways, Virginia acted as the perfect storm for the ecclesiastical 
crisis to occur.  The Code of Virginia contains a statute dating back to the 
 
62. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Goodson v. Northside Bible 
Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966), aff’d, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967). 
63. Compare In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 481 n.4, 198 P.3d at 76 n.4, with Bishop & 
Diocese of Colo., 716 P.2d at 91 n.6. 
64. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368); see also 
In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 478, 198 P.3d at 74) (noting that the First Amendment does 
not dictate that a state must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes). 
65. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604. 
66. See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1177–80. 
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Civil War that purports to resolve church property disputes.
67
  Additionally, 
when the Episcopal Church experienced a major division in 2003, several 
congregations that left the church were located in Virginia.
68
  Accordingly, 
the Virginia congregations’ battle to retain their church property gained 
nationwide attention as similarly situated dissident congregations in other 
states waited, hoping that the Virginia dispute could lend support to their 
efforts.69  This section identifies the relevant background of various factors 
contributing to Virginia’s recent ecclesiastical crisis.  Part II.A discusses the 
Virginia statute that governs church property disputes and the history of that 
statute.  Part II.B explains the events giving rise to the recent schism within 
the Episcopal Church.  Part II.C analyzes the events that unfolded as 
dissident congregations in Virginia attempted to retain control of church 
property following their separation from the Episcopal Church.  Part II.D 
summarizes the ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia on the dispute and 
its reasoning in reaching that ruling. 
 
A.  Virginia’s Statutory Framework for Church Property Disputes 
As between the deference approach, the neutral principles of law 
approach, and the special statutes approach, the Virginia General Assembly 
elected to resolve church property disputes through the use of a special 
statute.
70
  Indeed, Virginia adopted its church property dispute statute, 
Virginia Code section 57-9 (“Section 57-9”), before the United States 
Supreme Court made several significant decisions delineating constitutional 
principles applying to government resolution of church property disputes.
71
  
Section 57-9(A) is a Civil War-era statute meant to determine various 
parties’ property rights in church property when a congregational “division” 
occurs within a hierarchical “church” or a “religious society.”
72
  It provides, 
in relevant part, that: 
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in a church or 
religious society, to which any such congregation whose property is held by 
trustees is attached, the members of such congregation over 18 years of age 
may, by a vote of a majority of the whole number, determine to which branch 
of the church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.
73
 
 
67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
68. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 15, 694 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2010); Schjonberg, supra note 12. 
69. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559. 
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
71. Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 57-9 (Repl. 2007)). 
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A). 
73. See id. 
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The statute purports to provide courts with a neutral method for resolving 
property disputes that surround a specific church’s property when a 
congregation of that church divides and a majority of the congregation 
votes to belong to a branch of the church to which it was formerly 
attached.74  However, deciding when a “division” has occurred, or whether 
a church is a branch of a particular hierarchy, carries its own inherent 
difficulties.
75
  Namely, the resolution of these issues can easily become 
ecclesiastical quicksand, dragging the courts into the impermissible realm 
of deciding matters within the province of religious governance.
76
 
Section 57-9(A)’s roots reach back to the Reconstruction era.  The 
Virginia General Assembly enacted the Virginia Religious Freedom Act 
(“VRFA”)—the predecessor to Section 57-9(A)—in 1867.
77
  The General 
Assembly enacted the VRFA against the backdrop of several major church 
divisions that had already occurred as a result of diverging perspectives on 
the issues of slavery and federalism.
78
  John Baldwin—at this point in time 
 
74. Id. 
75. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1863 (1998) (“A look at appellate decisions, which develop alternatives among 
the options the Supreme Court has left open, reveals that the law is less straightforward than one might 
suppose from reading the Court's jurisprudence.”); Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 443. Compare 
Hoskinson v. Pusey, 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428, 439 (1879) (implicitly recognizing that the division statute 
does not require that a division be authorized or approved by a denomination), with Reid v. Gholson, 
229 Va. 179, 192, 327 S.E.2d 107, 115 (1985) (defining “division” as “to separate from the body of [the] 
church . . . to rend it into groups, each of which seeks to take over all the property and characterize the 
other as apostate, excommunicated, and outcast . . . such a division [must be created] as a prerequisite to 
relief under [Section] 57-9”). 
76. Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001); see 
also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221–22 (1963); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 
449 (1969) (noting that the First Amendment “commands civil courts to decide church property disputes 
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious 
organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require 
the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”). 
77. See Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 57-9 (Repl. 2007)); see also Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 108, 12 S.E. 228, 230 (1890). 
78. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1848.  One such division involved the Methodist Episcopal Church 
(“MEC”) in 1844.  See Humphrey v. Burnside, 67 Ky. 215, 225–26 (1868) (noting that the separation 
within MEC was one of the most prominent divisions at the time and “was an event that . . . formed a 
part of, the history of the country, of which no well-informed man could be ignorant”).  Pursuant to a 
“plan of separation” adopted by the MEC General Convention, MEC formally divided into a northern 
and southern branch.  See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 298-99, 301 (1853).  The MEC General 
Convention’s resolution allowed for congregations that resided in the area constituting the border 
between the northern and southern branch to align itself with either branch.  See Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 
Va. (13 Gratt) 301, 326 (1856).  To do so, the individual church needed to present the matter to its 
congregation to be decided by majority vote; several years after the division occurred, contention arose 
as to whether the MEC or the MEC South was the appropriate beneficiary of a particular trust.  Id. at 
323–24, 327.  The parties to the dispute were opposing factions at two churches in Fauquier County, 
with one faction being supported by the northern branch and one faction being supported by the southern 
branch.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Virginia held that, pursuant to the separation plan, the MEC 
experienced a division subsequent to the effective date of the deed in question, but prior to the date on 
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the Speaker of the House of Delegates—sponsored the VRFA.
79
  The 
General Assembly’s intent behind enacting the statute was to provide the 
courts with a method of managing church property disputes in light of the 
doctrinal instability of churches during that period in history.
80
  As 
originally enacted, the statute provided: 
[W]hereas divisions have occurred in some churches or religious societies to 
which such religious congregations have been attached, and such divisions may 
hereafter occur, it shall in any such case be lawful for the communicants... by a 
vote of a majority of the whole number... to determine to which branch of the 
church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.
81
 
The statute, as originally enacted and currently, affords congregations 
executing voting procedures in accordance with the provision significant 
protection against having to surrender their property to the parent church 
because a judicial determination of property rights under Section 57-9(A) is 
“conclusive as to the title to and control of any property held in trust for 
such congregation.”
82
  Although Section 57-9 provides the basis of 
considerable church property litigation,
83
 it is not the only statute in the 
Virginia code affecting the ability of religious institutions to own property.  
Rather, it is one of several statutes in the Virginia Code that address the 
disposition of property held by religious organizations.
84
  This Article, 
 
which the case reached the court.  Id. at 327.  Presuming that the separation plan had been properly 
adopted by the MEC General Convention—making it valid—the provision of that plan which allowed 
border societies to vote “to choose to which jurisdictional division of the church they w[ould] belong 
[either to the MEC or MEC South],” was derivatively valid.  Id. at 326.  Noting that the church at issue 
fell within the border region and, by majority vote, adhered to the MEC South, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia held that the deed operated to convey the property to the members of the southern branch.  Id. 
at 327–28. 
79. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal I, 76 Va. Cir. 786, 843 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008); see also HAMILTON JAMES 
ECKENRODE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 41 (J.M. Vincent et al., 
eds. 1904). 
80. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal I, 76 Va. Cir. at 855. 
81. Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 57-9 (Repl. 2007)). 
82. Id.  The first Supreme Court of Virginia case to discuss the predecessor statute to Section 57-9 is 
Hoskinson v. Pusey.  73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428 (1879).  Once again, members of the MEC and the MEC 
South were disputing property rights as to church property purporting to be located within the border 
area of the 1844 division.  Id. at 431.  Specifically, the property at issue involved a “house of public 
worship” known as “Harmony Church” and a parsonage.  Id. at 431, 434.  In that case, the deed 
addressing the disposition of the properties contained the same substantive language as the deed at issue 
in the Brooke case.  Id.  However, the alignment of the members of the church remained unclear because 
of inconsistent and conflicting voting occurring at local conferences.  Id. at 440.  Although 
understanding the intricacies of the case’s factual background are not necessary for the purposes of this 
article, it is worth noting that Hoskinson could arguably be read as holding that a “division” under 
Section 57-9 need not occur in accordance with the hierarchical church’s policy to qualify as a 
“division” within the meaning of the statute. 
83. See Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 (1967); Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 12 S.E. 228 
(1890); Hoskinson, 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428 (1879); Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 Va. (13 Gratt) 301 (1856). 
84. In distinguishing the statutory framework governing property held for religious purposes, McCarthy 
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however, will primarily focus on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s treatment 
of Section 57-9(A) in light of the recent rupture in the Episcopal Church. 
 
B.  Rupture in the Episcopal Church Reaches Virginia 
The Episcopal Church (“TEC”) formally organized in 1789 as the 
successor to the Church of England in colonial America.
85
  TEC is 
primarily located in the United States but also maintains a presence outside 
the country.
86
  It is the principal national church following the Anglican 
tradition in the United States.
87
  As an Anglican church, there is worldwide 
affiliation between TEC and other Anglican churches by way of the 
Anglican Communion.
88
  The Anglican Communion, however, is not vested 
with formal decision-making authority over any of its members.
89
  Rather, 
“[t]he churches of the Anglican Communion are held together by bonds of 
affection and common loyalty, expressed through links with the 
‘Instruments of Communion.’”
90
  These “instruments of communion” are 
the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lambeth Conference, the Primates 
 
stated: 
Section 57-9 is connected to a larger statutory scheme in Virginia that governs property 
held for religious purposes. Overall, the code emphasizes a distinction between 
congregational and hierarchical churches. It also requires that a trust for an indefinite 
beneficiary (such as an individual or unincorporated body) be expressly validated by 
statute. Section 57-7.1 validates transfers of religious property that are “made to or for the 
benefit of any church, church diocese, religious congregation or religious society.” There 
are two sections of the code that provide alternative methods for holding religious 
property. Section 57-16(A), enacted in 1942, permits church property to be held in the 
name of an ecclesiastical officer. Section 57-16.1, enacted in 2005, permits an 
unincorporated church or religious body to create a corporation to hold, administer, and 
manage its real and personal property. Thus, if a hierarchical body wants to avoid having 
the congregational form of governance imposed on it by Section 57-9(A), the alternative 
options of incorporating or titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer are 
found in the other statutes. Finally, Section 57-15 addresses alterations made to church 
property outside of the context of a church division. 
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1849–50 (citations omitted). 
85. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332. 
86. See The Episcopal Church, Partnerships, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/110056_ENG_HTM.htm 
(last visited Dec. 10, 2010) (detailing the church’s presence and partnerships with countries in Africa, 
Asia-Pacific, Latin American, the Caribbean and the Middle East). 
87. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 14, 694 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2010). 
88. The Episcopal Church, Partnerships, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/110056_ENG_HTM.htm (last 
visited Dec. 10, 2010). 
89. “The Anglican Communion is an international body that consists of 38 ‘provinces,’ which are 
‘regional and national churches that share a common history of their understanding of the Church 
catholic through the See of Canterbury’ in England.”  Truro, 280 Va. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 558 (internal 
citation omitted). 
90. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332–33. 
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Meeting, and the Anglican Consultative Council.
91
  TEC maintains a 
national leadership structure and a regional leadership structure level.
92
  At 
the national level, TEC leadership promulgates canons and constitutional 
provisions that are binding on the local congregations.
93
  At the regional 
level, the governing authority is the diocese for a particular region.
94
  A 
bishop is charged with governing the diocese and all decisions by the 
diocese are binding on the parishes that fall within its borders.
95
 
Every three years, the highest governing body within TEC—the General 
Convention—meets to discuss and form resolutions in matters of church 
governance and doctrine.
 96
  Resolutions adopted by the General 
Convention are binding on TEC and the dioceses.
97
  In 2003, the General 
Convention met to address several controversial issues giving rise to 
internal disputes within the denomination.
98
  Specifically, the debate 
focused on the acceptability of allowing non-celibate homosexuals to serve 
as Episcopal bishops and whether TEC would offer its blessing and 
endorsement as to same-sex marriages.
99
  As a result of its deliberations, the 
General Convention took several actions, including: (a) confirming the 
election of Gene Robinson, a non-celibate homosexual priest, as Bishop of 
the Diocese of New Hampshire of TEC; (b) adopting resolution allowing 
 
91. Id.  The actions proposed at these various gatherings are not binding on any members of the 
Anglican Communion, but are “primarily consultative” in nature.  Truro, 280 Va. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 
559. Thus, any resolution proposed by the Anglican Communion only becomes binding upon a 
particular church if that church ratifies the resolution through its own internal governing structure.  Id. 
92. McElroy, supra note 6, at 333.  But see Philip Turner, Communion and Episcopal Authority, 
http://www.anglicancommunioninstitute.com/2009/07/communion-and-episcopal-authority/ (Jul. 9, 
2009) (“Within [t]he Episcopal Church there is no constitutional provision for a hierarchical structure 
that places the authority of individual Bishops in their Dioceses within a larger structure to which they 
must defer.”).  Dr. Turner argues that the Episcopal Church is, in fact, not a hierarchical church but “an 
association of [d]ioceses that lacks an ordered hierarchy save within the various Dioceses that comprise 
its membership.”  Id.  However, the Supreme Court of Virginia made its ruling on the assumption that 
TEC is a hierarchical church, not an association of dioceses. Truro, 280 Va. at 7, 694 S.E.2d at 557.  
Thus, this article will proceed under the same assumption. 
93. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332–33. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559.  According to the Executive Offices of the General 
Convention: 
The General Convention is the governing body of The Episcopal Church (TEC) that 
meets every three years. The Convention is a bicameral legislature that includes the 
House of Deputies and the House of Bishops. The work at Convention is carried out by 
deputies and bishops representing each diocese. During its triennial meeting deputies and 
bishops consider a wide range of important matters facing the Church. 
Executive Offices of the General Convention, Office of the General Convention, 
http://generalconvention.org/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). 
97. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
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churches to offer their blessings and endorsements in regards to same-sex 
unions; and (c) rejecting a resolution seeking to preserve TEC’s position on 
issues of sexuality in a manner consistent with the traditional Christian 
faith.
100
  These actions were ill-received by many members of TEC 
nationwide.
101
  Indeed, they gave rise to considerable division among 
congregation members practicing their faith in the Protestant Episcopal 
Church in the Diocese of Virginia (“the Diocese”) because the diocesan 
leadership supported Robinson’s confirmation.
102
  Outraged by the 
resolutions adopted by the 2003 General Convention’s and the Diocese’s 
support of Robinson’s confirmation, congregants from various churches 
proceeded to send hundreds of letters of dissent to the Diocese and withhold 
the payment of pledges previously committed to the Diocese and TEC.
103
 
Internal segregation ensued within the TEC on a national level 
throughout 2004 and 2005, and the Diocese attempted to manage its own 
internal division by forming a “Reconciliation Commission.”
104
  The 
Reconciliation Commission sought to address the congregation’s concerns 
regarding the controversial resolutions of the General Convention.105  When 
these efforts proved fruitless, the Reconciliation Commission promulgated 
voting procedures that allowed the congregations to separate from the 
Diocese.
106
  Several congregations performed the necessary votes to initiate 
the separation procedures.
107
  Their attempts to separate ultimately failed, 
however.
108
  Diocesan leadership informed the congregations that TEC 
changed its position on congregational separation and any separation 
purportedly achieved through the Reconciliation Commission’s procedures 
would not be binding on TEC or the Diocese.
109
  Despite this change in 
position, fifteen congregations voted to separate from the Diocese between 
2006 and 2007.
110
 
After separating from the Diocese, the dissident congregations sought to 
align themselves with another church affiliated with the Anglican 
 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at559. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 15–16, 694 S.E.2d at 559–60. 
107. Id. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560. 
108. Id. 
109. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 16, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010). 
110. Id.  Indeed, congregational uproar within TEC was not limited to the Diocese of Virginia.  Id.  
Congregations belonging to other dioceses also voiced their discontent with the 2003 General 
Convention and, ultimately, separated from their respective dioceses.  Id. 
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Communion.
111
  Ultimately, they voted to attach to a stateside province of 
the Church of Nigeria.
112
  Originally, the Church of Nigeria’s ministry 
consisted of governing the Anglican churches in the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria.
113
  It established a mission in the United States, which was 
identified as the “Convocation of Anglican Nigerians in America.”
114
  This 
mission provided oversight to expatriate Nigerian congregations in the 
continental United States.
115
  In 2006, the Church of Nigeria reorganized 
and expanded the mission.
116
  Amongst other changes, the mission was 
renamed as the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (“CANA”).
117
  
CANA established a presence in Virginia by forming a district within the 
Commonwealth that it labeled the Anglican District of Virginia 
(“ADV”).
118
  Presumably, CANA’s efforts to reorganize its operations and 
establish a formal presence in Virginia stemmed from its desire to welcome 
the recently disaffiliated Virginia congregations into ADV.119  The 
realignment of the congregations with CANA, however, did anything but 
bring an end to the dissident congregations interactions with TEC.  Indeed, 
the congregations and TEC were destined to clash again.  This struggle, 
however, would not be over matters of church doctrine.  Rather, the stage 
was set for the parties to begin their battle over who was entitled to possess 
and make use of the congregation’s property occupied when congregations 
separated from TEC. 
 
C.  The Battle for Church Property 
Following their attachment to ADV, the dissident congregations sought 
to establish what property interests, if any, they maintained in their 
respective locations.
120
  In 2006 and 2007, nine congregations within ADV 
(“CANA Congregations”) filed petitions pursuant to Section 57-9(A) within 
their respective circuit courts seeking a judicial determination that a 
division occurred within TEC and the congregations had voted to align with 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 16, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, by 2007, 10,000 of CANA’s 12,000 members were 
former members of Episcopalian congregations.  Id. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560. 
120. Id. 
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a different branch of the TEC.
121
  Per the language of the statute, if a 
congregation made such a determination, and the court approved that 
determination, the court should enter an order reflecting that determination, 
and that order would be “conclusive as to title and control.”
122
  In support of 
their petitions, the CANA Congregations argued that: (a) the separations, as 
they occurred throughout 2004 to 2007, constituted a division within TEC, 
as contemplated by Section 57-9; (b) subsequent to the division, the 
congregations voted to affiliate with ADV, a qualifying “branch” of the 
Anglican Communion; and (c) as a result, ownership of the properties 
passed to the respective congregations located thereon by operation of 
Section 57-9.123 
Not surprisingly, the Diocese and TEC opposed the grant of the petitions 
and filed complaints against each of the CANA Congregations alleging 
trespass and conversion.
124
  Additionally, the Diocese and TEC filed 
declaratory judgment actions that sought “a determination of trust, 
proprietary, and contract rights, if any, that the Diocese and [TEC] had in 
the properties used by the CANA Congregations which were the subject of 
[Section] 57-9(A) petitions.”
125
  The Diocese and TEC challenged CANA 
Congregations’ petitions on the basis of several arguments, including: (a) 
the congregations’ separation from the TEC and the Diocese did not qualify 
as a “division” within TEC or the Diocese, as contemplated by Section 57-
9; and (b) even assuming the CANA Congregations’ separations did qualify 
as a division with TEC or the Diocese, the CANA Congregations failed to 
satisfy the statute’s “branch” requirement because CANA or the ADV did 
not operate as a branch of TEC or the Diocese.126 
The Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on the Multiple Claimant 
Litigation Act,
127
  appointed a three-judge panel to manage the dispute.
128
  
The panel consolidated the various actions brought by each of the CANA 
Congregations and established venue for the matter in Fairfax County.129  
The trial court first held a hearing to determine the applicability of Section 
57-9.
130
  The CANA Congregations, Diocese, and TEC presented expert 
 
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
122. Id. 
123. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 17, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010). 
124. Id. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560–61; In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Property Litigation, 76 Va. 
Cir. 786, 788 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008). 
125. Truro, 280 Va. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560–61. 
126. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
127. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
128. Truro, 280 Va. at 17–18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
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testimony and argument as to whether the statute controlled in the case.
131
  
The evidence of all parties primarily focused on constructing the definitions 
of the terms “division” and “branch” in accordance with how those terms 
would have been used in the context of the various nineteenth century 
church divisions that gave rise to the enactment of the predecessor statute of 
Section 57-9.
132
  Following the hearing, the court issued an opinion in 
which it held that “the Diocese, TEC, and the Anglican Communion were 
all ‘church[es] or religious societ[ies],’ and that CANA, the ADV, the 
Church of Nigeria, [TEC], and the Diocese were all ‘branches’ of the 
Anglican Communion for purposes of applying [Section] 57-9(A).”133  
Furthermore, the court found that CANA and ADV were “branches” of 
TEC and the Diocese.
134
  Thus, according to the circuit court, the CANA 
Congregations Section 57-9(A) petitions were properly before it and the 
congregations were entitled to have the court determine what property 
interests, if any, they were granted by the statute.
135
 
Following the circuit court’s ruling that Section 57-9(A) provided the 
controlling authority in the case, TEC and the Diocese challenged the 
statute’s constitutionality on several grounds—namely, that Section 57-9 
violated the United States Constitution’s and Virginia Constitution’s free 
exercise clauses, principles of due process, and the contracts clause.
136
  
After holding several hearings on the matter, the circuit court issued an 
opinion letter upholding the constitutionality of Section 57-9.
137
  Shortly 
thereafter, the court granted the CANA Congregations’ Section 57-9 
petitions and dismissed TEC’s and the Diocese’s declaratory judgment 
actions as moot.
138
 
TEC and the Diocese appealed the circuit court’s holding to the Supreme 
Court of Virginia, arguing that the circuit court erroneously concluded that 
Section 57-9(A) applied in the case.  In the alternative, they argued that if 
the circuit court’s holding constituted an appropriate application of the 
statute, the application of Section 57-9 could not pass constitutional 
muster.
139
  On November 9, 2009, the court granted the appeal.
140
  It 
reversed the circuit court’s order in full and reinstated the Diocese’s 
 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 18–19, 694 S.E.2d at 561. 
136. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d  at 561. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 561–62. 
140. Id. 
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Episcopal Church’s declaratory judgment actions and CANA 
Congregations’ counterclaims to those actions.
141
  Although the court 
remanded the proceeding to the circuit court for further resolution of the 
issues, it did so with express instructions to decide the dispute by applying 
real property law and contract law.
142
 
 
D.  Summary of Court’s Reasoning 
At the outset of its review of the circuit court’s holding, the court broadly 
summarized the assignments of error raised by TEC and the Diocese into 
two principal issues: (a) whether the record supported a finding that Section 
57-9(A) controlled over the dispute; and (b) whether the circuit court 
correctly held that Section 57-9(A) passed constitutional muster under both 
the United States Constitution and Virginia Constitution.
143
  The court 
explained that, per the principle of constitutional avoidance, it would first 
review assignments of error challenging the applicability of Section 57-9 
before attempting to analyze the constitutionality of the statute.
144
 
The court began its review of the applicability of Section 57-9(A) by 
reviewing the definitions of key statutory language that the circuit court 
constructed and relied on in granting CANA Congregations’ Section 57-
9(A) petitions.
145
  Specifically, the court focused on the portion of the 
statute that provided: 
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in a church or 
religious society, to which any such congregation whose property is held by 
trustees is attached, the members of such congregation over 18 years of age 
may, by a vote of a majority of the whole number, determine to which branch 
of the church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.
146
 
The circuit court based its holding that the CANA Congregations’ were 
properly before the court on the way in which it interpreted “division,” 
“church or religious society,” “attached” and “branch.”  The Supreme Court 
of Virginia, however, did not follow the same analytical track.
147
  Rather, 
the statutory language that primarily guided the court’s analysis was the 
“branch” and “division” language of Section 57-9.
148
 
 
141. Id. at 29–30, 694 S.E.2d at 568. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562. 
144. Id. (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)). 
145. Id. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 562–63. 
146. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
147. Truro, 280 Va. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
148. Id.  The Court reviewed the circuit court’s definition of these terms de novo with the objective of 
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Having identified which terms appeared relevant to the dispute, the court 
explained that “whether a congregation is entitled to petition for the relief 
afforded by [Section] 57-9(A)” is determined by the occurrence of certain 
factual prerequisites needed to trigger the statute’s applicability to the 
case.149  The court explained that the CANA Congregations needed to prove 
that a “‘division [occurred]... in a church or religious society [ ] to which...  
[the congregations were] attached’” and “the ‘branch of the church or 
society’ to which the congregation[s] vote[d] to belong... [were] a branch of 
the ‘church or religious society [ ] to which [the congregations were] 
attached’ prior to the ‘division.’”
150
  As a practical matter, this holding 
mandates a two-step analytical process.
151
  First, the congregation seeking 
to invoke Section 57-9 must demonstrate that it was previously attached to 
a church or religious society in which a division occurred.
152
  If that hurdle 
can be overcome, the congregation must next demonstrate that it voted to 
realign itself with a different branch of the same church or religious society 
that experienced the division.
153
 
Applying the two-step analytical framework to the facts in the record, the 
court first considered whether a division occurred in any relevant church or 
religious society.
154
  Before assigning any definition to the term “division,” 
the court addressed and quickly disposed of two ancillary issues: (a) 
whether a division occurred at the Anglican Communion level and (b) 
whether a division could only occur if performed through the formal 
procedures of TEC.
155
  As to the first preliminary issue, it concluded that 
the record did not support finding a “division” occurred at the Anglican 
Communion level and noted the circuit court’s error in finding to the 
contrary.
156
  Given the court’s conclusion that a division at the Anglican 
Communion level did not occur, it followed that the CANA Congregations’ 
 
assigning their plain and ordinary meaning—in accordance with the historical context that gave rise to 
the enactment of the predecessor of  Section 57-9—the interrelationship of the words being considered.  
Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 21–22, 694 S.E.2d at 563 (alterations in original).  Recall that “when used in reference to 
religious entities, the term ‘polity’ refers to the internal structural governance of the denomination.”  Id. 
at 12 n.1, 694 S.E.2d at 558 n.1 (citing Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church 
Property, supra note 20, at 1143–44). 
151. See Henry L. Chambers Jr. & Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado About Nothing Much: Protestant 
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 141, 147–48 (2010). 
152. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 21–22, 694 S.E.2d 555, 563 (2010). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. To meet their burden of establishing the applicability of Section 57-9(A) to their respective 
properties, the CANA Congregations were required to first demonstrate they were previously attached to 
a church or religious society that experienced a division.  Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
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Section 57-9(A) petitions would only be proper if the record established 
that “division” occurred within  some other relevant church or religious 
society.
157
  While the court indicated the next logical step would be to 
consider whether a division occurred in TEC and the Diocese, it first 
resolved the second preliminary question surrounding the statutory term 
“division.”
158
 
The second preliminary issue—and a major point of contention between 
the parties—was whether a division, as contemplated by Section 57-9(A), 
could only occur if it were a formal division in accordance with the 
church’s polity.
159
  TEC and the Diocese argued that prior case law 
interpreting Section 57-9(A) supported the position that, for a division to 
occur as contemplated by that provision, it must be achieved formally 
through the church’s governing authority.
160
  However, according to the 
court, defining “division” so as to include such a requirement would run 
afoul to the mandate of the First Amendment by creating a “risk [of] 
entangling the courts in matters of religious governance.”
161
  The court 
explained that “[w]hile it is certainly possible that a division within a 
hierarchical church could occur through an orderly process under the 
church’s polity, history and common sense suggest that such is rarely the 
case.”
162
  It based this conclusion on the position that “experience shows 
that a division within a formerly uniform body almost always arises from a 
disagreement between the leadership under the polity and a dissenting 
group.”
163
 
Having established the CANA Congregations did not need to show that a 
division was accomplished in accordance with church polity for its Section 
57-9 petitions to be appropriate, the court turned to the question of whether 
 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Brief of Appellant at 2, 5, 21,Truro, 280 Va. 6, 694 S.E.2d 555 (2010) (No. 090682).  “When used 
in reference to religious entities, the term ‘polity’ refers to the internal structural governance of the 
denomination.”  Truro, 280 Va. at 12, 694 S.E.2d at 558 n.1 (citing Judicial Intervention in Disputes 
Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1143–44). 
160. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 25.  Canon I.7.3 establishes that a trustee of TEC property 
cannot alienate or encumber the property used solely for church purposes without authorizing the 
transfer with the bishop and standing committee of the diocese in which the parish is located.  THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTION & CANONS 48–49 (The Archives 
of the Episcopal Church, eds., 2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION & CANONS].  Canon II.6.2 establishes 
that a trustee of TEC property cannot alienate or encumber the property used solely for church purposes 
without authorizing the transfer with the bishop.  Id. at 72. 
161. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566; Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 
604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001). 
162. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
163. Id. 
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a division had occurred within the Episcopal Church at the Diocese.
164
  It 
noted that the circuit court defined “division,” as “‘[a] split... or rupture in a 
religious denomination that involve[s] the separation of a group of 
congregations, clergy, or members from the church, and the formation of an 
alternative polity that disaffiliating members could join.’”165  Although not 
expressly commenting on the propriety of this definition, the court 
implicitly ratified it by analyzing whether the evidence set forth in the 
record satisfied that legal standard.
166
  After reviewing the record, the court 
concluded “[t]he evidence presented by the CANA Congregations clearly 
establishes that a split or rupture has occurred within the Diocese and, given 
the evidence of similar events in other dioceses of [TEC], the split or 
rupture has occurred at the national level as well.”
167
 
Following its conclusion that a division occurred at both the regional and 
national levels of TEC, the court turned to the second of two statutory 
prerequisites that the CANA Congregations needed to establish to assert 
property rights pursuant to Section 57-9(A): whether the CANA 
Congregations voted to affiliate with a “branch” of TEC and the Diocese 
following the division.
168
  Phrased alternatively, the court needed to 
determine whether CANA or ADV were branches of TEC and the 
Diocese.169  In answering this question, the court emphasized the 
importance of the fact that, although CANA’s expansion to allow the newly 
separated CANA Congregations to join its ranks occurred in response to the 
disputes within TEC, CANA’s expansion did not occur as a result of the 
division.
170
  Thus, it concluded: 
while CANA is an ‘alternative polity’ to which the congregations could and did 
attach themselves, we hold that, within the meaning of [Section] 57-9(A), 
CANA is not a ‘branch’ of either TEC or the Diocese to which the 
congregations could vote to join following the ‘division’ in TEC and the 
Diocese as contemplated by [Section] 57-9(A).
171
 
 
164. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. 
165. Id. at 25, 694 S.E.2d at 565. 
166. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
167. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.  The CANA Congregations also provided expert testimony supporting 
their position that a division occurred within the meaning of the statute.  Id. at 18, 23–24, 694 S.E.2d at 
561, 564.  Given that there was no serious dispute between the parties that, prior to the 2003 meeting of 
the General Convention, the CANA Congregations were attached to TEC and the Diocese, the court 
further added that the circuit court had properly held that a division occurred within TEC and the 
Diocese and that the CANA Congregations were attached to TEC and the Diocese at the time of the 
division.  Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
168. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
171. Id. 
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Accordingly, with the common Anglican bond between TEC and CANA 
notwithstanding, the CANA Congregations failed to demonstrate that they 
voted to belong to a branch of the TEC or the Diocese following the 
division and they could not seek relief under the statute.
172
 
The court provided additional clarification to prevent its interpretation of 
Section 57-9(A) from being misunderstood as holding that an organization 
qualifies as a branch of a church only if it operates under the control of the 
church that experienced the division.  In this regard, the court noted that 
operation as a separate polity would not necessarily bar a given religious 
organization from qualifying as a branch of a church or religious society 
that operates under a different polity or hierarchical structure.
173
  However, 
in that scenario, “[Section 57-9(A)] requires that each branch proceed from 
the same polity, and not merely a shared tradition of faith.”
174
  Because 
CANA and ADV did not proceed from the same polity as TEC, the CANA 
Congregations could not rely on Section 57-9(A) to establish their rights in 
their respective properties.
175
  Accordingly, the court remanded the 
proceeding to the circuit court to be decided in accordance with property 
law and contract law.
176
 
The final outcome of Truro is yet to be decided.  Nonetheless, it is at 
least worth mentioning that it appears now that the case will be decided 
under the “neutral principles of law” approach as opposed to the “special 
statute” approach.  Indeed, the court indicated that principles of property 
and contract law would control the outcome of the dispute.
 177
  The circuit 
court will therefore need to examine the exact nature of the trust existing 
between the CANA Congregations, the Diocese, and TEC.  Furthermore, 
the circuit court will have to identify whether the CANA Congregations are 
contractually obligated to possess their respective properties in accordance 
with the canons and constitution of TEC—which specifically require a local 
parish to hold its respective property in trust for the Diocese and TEC.
178
 
Presumably, such legal principles are “neutral” in the sense that they 
could be applied in any dispute, not just church property disputes.
179
  It will 
 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). 
177. Id. 
178. See Wallace v. Hughes, 131 Ky. 445, 469, 115 S.W. 684, 691 (1909) (explaining that “religious 
organizations are merely voluntary associations, whose constitutions and laws are in their ultimate 
result, so far as the civil tribunals are concerned, in the nature of contracts between the members”). 
179. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
  
536 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST  [Vol. XIV:401 
be interesting to see, however, if such principles can be applied to Truro 
without implicating ecclesiastical questions.  Specifically, the circuit court 
may struggle to do so because the specifics of the trust relationship between 
the parties and any contractual obligation of the CANA Congregations to 
give unqualified accession to TEC canons and constitutions regarding the 
use of church property is delineated in TEC’s Constitution.
180
  This is 
problematic because the court will be required to read and interpret 
provisions of TEC’s Constitution, a situation that creates risk of deciding 
issues of religious doctrine and practice while attempting to extract the 
purely relevant legal language from the document.181 
The court’s decision that Truro be decided on principles of property and 
contract law is also noteworthy for another reason.
182
  Such a holding, albeit 
not expressly, manifests the court’s preference that lower courts make use 
of the neutral principles approach over the deference approach, if possible.  
As noted above, the Supreme Court left the decision of how to prioritize 
between the two approaches to the states.
183
  One could read the holding in 
Truro as establishing the priority that courts in Virginia should assign to the 
various approaches available for resolving church property disputes.  
Relying on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s approach in Truro as an 
analytical template, a court confronted with a church property dispute 
should first attempt to apply Section 57-9 to resolve the dispute.
184
  If the 
facts of the case do not allow for application of the statute, the court should 
then apply neutral principles of law to resolve the dispute.185  Accordingly,  
 
 
 
180. CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 160, at 72.  Canon II.6(1) requires property dedicated for 
worship or other ministry to “secured for ownership and use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation, or 
Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its Constitution and Canons.”  Id.  Canon II.6(2) 
establishes that a congregation may not alienate or encumber church property without the consent of the 
respective Diocese that oversees the congregation.  Id.  Additionally, Diocesan Canon 15.1 provides that 
“[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Church or Mission . . . is held in trust 
for The Episcopal Church and the Diocese.”  CONSTITUTION AND CANONS 
OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA 28 (The Diocese of Va., ed., 
2008) [hereinafter DIOCESAN CONSTITUTION & CANONS]. 
181. “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn 
on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”  Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. at 449. 
182. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 29, 694 S.E.2d 555, 567 (2010) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1(Repl. Vol. 
2007)). 
183. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595, 604 (1979). 
184. Truro, 280 Va. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611 
S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)). 
185. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). 
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a Virginia court will only turn to the deference approach in the event that 
application of the relevant neutral principles of law would require the court 
decide questions of religious doctrine and practice.
186
 
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia never reached the question of 
Section 57-9(A)’s constitutionality, its interpretation of the statute raises 
several constitutional issues that future courts applying the statute may be 
required to address.
187
  Indeed, it is likely that a party challenging the 
applicability of the statute to in a future case would argue in the alternate 
that the statute, if applicable, is unconstitutional.  Accordingly, it is 
necessary to identify the constitutional issues implicated by Section 57-9(A) 
and whether the issues provide sufficient basis for a court to hold the statute 
does not pass constitutional muster. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SECTION 57-9(A) 
Prior to the decision in Truro, Section 57-9 drew criticism as a statute 
destined to draw courts into the ecclesiastical thicket in violation of both the 
United States and Virginia constitutions.188  The proper application of the 
statute, however, remained relatively unknown until the Supreme Court of 
Virginia issued the Truro opinion.
189
  The question now lingers if, in light 
of Truro’s guidance, the statute can be applied in a way that does not offend 
the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment.
190
  This Part argues that Section 57-9(A) operates in violation 
of both religion clauses of the First Amendment.  Part III.A identifies the 
Establishment Clause issues implicated by Section 57-9(A), and Part III.B 
highlights the Free Exercise Clause issues implicated by Section 57-9(A).  
Part III.C discusses potential methods to apply the statute as it stands post-
Truro in light of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause issues 
surrounding it. 
 
186. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871). 
187. Truro, 280 Va. at 6, 694 S.E.2d at 555 (declining to address the constitutionality of Section 57-
9(A)). 
188. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1844–45, 1890. 
189. Prior to the Truro opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Section 57-9, or its precursor 
statute, to only a limited number of church property cases.  See, e.g., Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 327 
S.E.2d 107 (1985); Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 (1967); Allaun v. First & Merchs. 
Nat’l Bank, 190 Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949). 
190. Property statutes such as Section 57-9(A) are not unique to the Commonwealth. Several states 
have statutes meant to resolve property disputes in the event of a division within a church.  See e.g., In 
re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 488–89, 198 P.3d 66, 81 (2009) (noting California's statute 
as an example).  While such statutes are not per se excessive entanglement, “First Amendment values 
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts 
of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”  Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
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A.  Establishment Clause 
1.  Section 57-9(A) Entangles the Courts in Church Doctrine 
The primary Establishment Clause issue presented in Truro’s holding 
deals with how the court applied the statutory term “branch.”
191
  In 
discussing the issue of what constitutes a branch, the court noted that 
“[w]hile the branch joined may operate as a separate polity from the branch 
to which the congregation formerly was attached, the statute requires that 
each branch proceed from the same polity and not merely a shared tradition 
of faith.”
192
  In other words, the branch that the dissident congregation votes 
to affiliate with must be “derived” from the “church or religious society” 
that the dissident congregation is dividing from.193  In the case of Truro, the 
death knell to the CANA congregations’ petitions was that CANA merely 
maintained a shared tradition of faith with TEC, presumably through the 
Anglican Communion.
194
  According to the court, however, CANA did not 
“proceed” from TEC and it was not “derived” from TEC.
195
 
The nature of the “derived” standard is unclear though.  The court did not 
provide any guidance as to what the difference is between being “derived” 
from a church as opposed to merely sharing “a tradition of religious faith” 
with that church.
196
  While one may look at the fact pattern in Truro and 
comprehend the difference under the specific facts of that case (i.e., one can 
understand the court’s reasoning in finding CANA is not derived from 
TEC),
197
 the answer may not come so easily in future cases.  Although there 
does not appear to be any prior legal context for the word in Virginia case 
law, the standard definition of “derive” is “to trace from a source or 
origin.”
198
  Using such a term in relation to religious organizations is 
problematic because one church may have: (a) a traceable doctrinal 
connection to another church; (b) a traceable institutional connections to 
another church; or (c) both.  In other words, using the term “derived” in 
regards to religious institutions could reasonably be interpreted as doctrinal 
derivation or institutional derivation.
199
  While it seems intuitive to argue 
 
191. For the Supreme Court of Virginia’s discussion of the term “branch,” see Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 
694 S.E.2d at 567. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
194. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 23. 
195. Truro, 280 Va. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 536 (2d ed. 1993). 
199. For the purposes of this article, “doctrinal derivation” is used to describe a church that identifies 
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that a spin-off religious organization of a church of religious society should 
be doctrinally derived from the parent institution to qualify as a “branch,”
200
 
there would be no constitutional method of enforcing such a standard.  A 
judicial review of doctrinal derivation is no different than a judicial review 
of the “departed from doctrine” element of implied trust theory.
201
  Such an 
analysis would require the court decide to degree to which one church 
doctrinally departs from another church and whether such departures were 
significant enough that former could not be considered a branch of the 
latter.  To do so would a place a court in the position of assigning weight to 
various tenets of a particular faith, a role expressly disallowed in 
Presbyterian Church.202 
Given that a court cannot rely on doctrinal derivation because of the First 
Amendment’s prohibition of government action favoring one religious over 
another (or no religion at all), one is left to conclude that a court should 
apply “derived” as meaning the putative branch is institutionally derived 
from the parent church.
203
  Under this standard, the relevant inquiry would 
be whether an identifiable organizational affiliation between the putative 
branch and the parent church or religious society that experienced the 
division existed at some point in time prior to the division.
204
  But even this 
standard has its own ecclesiastical pitfalls.  For example, the strength of the 
connection required between the putative branch and the parent is uncertain.  
Must the putative branch be directly derived from the parent church that 
experienced the division, or can it be an institutional descendent of an 
organization that was directly derived from the parent church?  If the latter 
 
itself with a specific polity because of doctrinal similarities, not by way of former congregational 
migration.  “Institutional derivation ” refers to the situation in which one can trace the congregational 
migrations achieved through formal separations of one church to a point of origin in a specific polity. 
200. Indeed, this is the point TEC attempted to argue in Truro.  See 280 Va. at 24, 694 S.E.2d at 564. In 
a hierarchical polity, the internal governing authorities of that polity must be allowed to identify when a 
church is or is not a branch thereof.  Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567.  Otherwise, there is a strong risk that 
there will be many “branches” of that hierarchical church which are not subject to the canons and 
constitution of the polity.  Id. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559.  TEC would argue that a “branch” of TEC not 
formally recognized by its governing authorities is no branch at all.  Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.  Rather 
it is a wholly different freestanding religious organization.  Id. 
201. For a discussion of “departed from doctrine” element of implied trust theory, see Hassler, supra 
note 22, at 408–10; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1863–67. 
202. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969). 
203. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) 
(“[G]overnment should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.”); see also Epperson 
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216–17 (1963). 
204. One might be prompted to ask why such a connection would need to be demonstrated under the 
“derived” standard.  The answer is that, absent such a requirement, it would be impossible to distinguish 
the difference between a church or religious society that merely maintains a tradition of shared faith with 
the parent church or religious society as opposed to one that is derived from the parent church or 
religious society.  Pursuant to the court’s holding in Truro, the former does not qualify as a branch under 
the statute while the latter can.  280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
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situation is permissible, how will the court test the genealogy of the putative 
branch without becoming enmeshed in questions of church doctrine and 
structure? 
Furthermore, it is important to consider whether the putative branch must 
have separated from the parent organization in accordance with church 
polity to “proceed” or “derive” from a particular church.  This should not be 
confused with the question whether a church needed to separate from a 
religious institution in accordance with church polity for a “division” to 
occur.  The court plainly answered that question.
205
  Here, the issue is 
identifying what the requisite past relationship must be between two 
religious organizations for one to be considered branch of another.  
Requiring an unbroken chain of formal separations to connect the putative 
branch and the church that experienced the division provides a bright line 
rule on one hand, but a constitutional dilemma on the other.  A court 
attempting to analyze a separation—or a chain of separations—to determine 
if it can build a sufficient connection between the putative branch and 
parent church would necessarily have to familiarize itself with religious 
institutions’ various separation policies and procedures and attempt to apply 
them.  It seems unlikely that a court could make such analysis without 
thoroughly familiarizing itself with various church doctrines and resolving 
ecclesiastical questions in the process.206 
A faction does need to separate from the church in accordance with the 
polity’s formal procedures for it to “proceed” or “derive” from that parent 
church, however, the definition of “branch” becomes unworkably broad and 
creates the potential for absurd results.  For example, could a group of 
individuals visit a church for one Sunday, attend worship service, and start 
their own religious organization the following week and technically be 
 
205. Id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566. 
206. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Virginia realized the constitutional risk inherent in attempting to 
determine whether one religious body separated from another in accordance with church polity.  Truro, 
280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d 565–66.  Of course, the court could simply defer to the position of the parent 
religious institution that is involved in the dispute on this issue to avoid the ecclesiastical issues 
altogether.  Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.  However, such institutions usually have a significant interest in 
the outcome of the litigation and this raises concerns about the fairness of the proceeding.  The dispute 
involving Norcrest Presbyterian Church (“Norcrest”) is illustrative of this situation.  See Gardner, supra 
note 53, at 239–40 (citing GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 42, at 22 (discussing 
Norcrest’s experience with the adjudicatory process)).  The members of Norcrest were dissatisfied with 
the official position of the Presbyterian Church on several issues and wanted to separate from 
Presbyterianism by use of internal polity procedures.  See id. at 238–39.  After attempting to invoke 
internal procedures to do so, the governing Presbytery visited Norcrest, seized the pastor’s and church 
property, and changed the locks to the building.  Id.  The majority faction that invoked the separation 
procedures had no choice but to hold their next service at the local dog pound.  However, the minority 
faction that desired to remain attached to the Presbyterian Church was granted access to Norcrest for 
worship services.  Id. 
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“derived” from the church they visited the week prior?  Most would argue 
that such a result is not in accordance with the purpose and spirit of Section 
57-9.
207
  Certainly, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that the 
strength of the “historical connection” between the putative branch and the 
parent church is dispositive.208  But how does one test the strength of the 
historical connection between the putative branch and the parent if the 
standard is not requiring an unbroken chain of formal separations between 
the putative branch and the parent church?  Presumably, to avoid the absurd 
scenario posed by the question above, a court would need to evaluate the 
duration and level of involvement in the parent church that the purported 
branch invested during its time with the parent church.  Such an analysis 
arguably begins to look similar to a “departure from doctrine” analysis in 
that the court is looking at the level of involvement that one faction invested 
in a church and using its judgment to decide whether such involvement rose 
to a level sufficient so that it could be considered a “branch” of that church 
when it left.209  Doing so would consist of assigning weight to various 
religious activities—such as contributing to church funds or attending 
worship service—and attempting to compare the involvement of one faction 
of the church with another.  Such an analysis definitely raises concerns 
about offending the principle that a court cannot decide ecclesiastical 
questions in attempting to resolve a property dispute. If the court attempts 
to avoid this analysis to remain within the bounds of the First Amendment, 
however, it is not difficult to envision the result where a rogue faction floats 
from church and forms its own polity thereafter—thus, becoming a branch 
of numerous churches.
210
 
 
2.  Section 57-9(A) Favors Specific Forms of Religious Government 
Potential for excessive entanglement is not the only Establishment 
Clause concern raised by Section 57-9(A).  There is also cause for concern 
that the statute constitutes a government preference for congregational 
churches.  To this end, the First Amendment requires that government be 
neutral in matters of religion.  Indeed, the government may not 
 
207. See McElroy, supra note 6, at 335–36; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1849–50. 
208. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 566–67. 
209. See Hassler, supra note 22, at 408–10; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1863–67. 
210. A hypothetical may help illustrate the point.  A group of ten individuals decide to attend the 
Presbyterian Church for five weeks.  Subsequently, they attend services with the Episcopal Church for 
five weeks.  Following the ten-week period, the individuals form their own polity as a combination of 
lessons learned at the Presbyterian Church and the Episcopal Church.  Are they a branch of the 
Presbyterian Church, the Episcopal Church, both, or neither?  Would it matter if, instead of ten 
individuals, it was one thousand individuals?  Would it matter if, instead of attending each church five 
weeks, the faction attended each church six months? 
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constitutionally prefer one religion over another or over no religion at all.
211
  
The mandate of government neutrality towards religion is grounded in both 
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment.
212
  Accordingly, it can be difficult to analyze the issue of 
government neutrality as purely an establishment issue or a free exercise 
issue.  These difficulties notwithstanding, it is well-settled that the mandate 
that the “government should not prefer one religion to another” is “a 
principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause.”213 
There are two potential ways in which Section 57-9(A) violates the 
Establishment Clause requirement of government neutrality towards 
different forms of religion: (a) by favoring one form of hierarchical church 
over another form of hierarchical church; and (b) by imposing burdens on 
hierarchical churches that it does not impose on congregational churches.
214
  
As to the first issue, some hierarchical churches, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church, opt not to hold their property by trustees.
215
  Section 57-
9(A), by its plain language, only applies to hierarchical churches that hold 
their property in trust.216  Hierarchical churches such as the Roman Catholic 
Church therefore face no risk of losing their property by way of Section 57-
9(A) when congregational majorities leave the church.
217
  On the other 
hand, hierarchical churches that have structured their internal governing 
system so as to hold their property in trust—such as TEC—can lose their 
property when a congregational majority departs from the church.
218
  
Indeed, TEC would have lost significant property pursuant to Section 57-
9(A) if the CANA Congregations had been more strategic in the 
realignment process.
219
  Accordingly, it could be argued that Section 57-
9(A) operates to effectively penalize churches such as TEC for adopting the 
internal structure they have while simultaneously preferring churches such 
 
211. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone of our analysis is the 
principle that the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and 
between religion and nonreligion.” (citations omitted)). 
212. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–34 (1993) (explaining the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires government neutrality towards religion); Larson 
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (explaining the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 
requires government neutrality towards religion). 
213. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994). 
214. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1847. 
215. Id. 
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
217. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 38–39; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1847. 
218. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1844. 
219. The Supreme Court of Virginia found the statute inapplicable because CANA and ADV were not 
branches of TEC.  Truro, 280 Va. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567.  If the CANA Congregations would have 
aligned themselves with a branch of the TEC, the outcome of the case would likely have been very 
different. 
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as the Roman Catholic Church for adopting the structure they have.
220
  Such 
a preference runs strictly afoul to “[t]he clearest command of the 
Establishment Clause” which is “that one religious denomination cannot be 
officially preferred over another.”
221
 
As to the second potential issue, Section 57-9 could be read as providing 
preferential treatment to congregational churches or hierarchical issues.
222
  
Although Section 57-9 does not expressly make reference to 
“congregational” churches or “hierarchical” churches, the language of its 
two provisions establishes that Section 57-9(A) applies to hierarchical 
churches while Section 57-9(B) applies to congregational churches.  This is 
evident in that Section 57-9(A) applies when a division has occurred “in a 
church or religious society, to which any... congregation... is attached.”
223
  
Section 57-9(B), on the other hand, applies when division occurs in church 
or religious society “which, in its organization and government, is a church 
or society entirely independent of any other church or general society.”
224
  
Section 57-9(B) wholly defers to the religious practice of congregational 
churches.225 It provides: 
[The] majority of the members of such congregation, entitled to vote by its 
constitution as existing at the time of the division, or where it has no written 
constitution, entitled to vote by its ordinary practice or custom, may decide the 
right, title, and control of all property held in trust for such congregation.
226
 
While Section 57-9(B) defers to the constitutions, practices, or religious 
customs of congregational churches undergoing a division to resolve a 
church property dispute, hierarchical churches receive no such deference.
227
  
Indeed, the constitutions, practices, or customs of the hierarchical 
experiencing the division church are not even mentioned in Section 57-
9(A).
228
  Rather, Section 57-9(A) removes power to control the disposition 
of church property from the governing bodies of hierarchical churches and 
reallocates it in the hands of local congregational majorities.  Regardless of 
what a hierarchical church’s constitution, practice, or custom mandates in 
 
220. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885–86 (discussing how Section 57-9(A) unnecessarily burdens 
hierarchical churches that hold their property in trust while not imposing the same burden on 
hierarchical churches that do not hold their property in trust). 
221. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
222. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885 (“Under Section 57-9, hierarchical organizations are not free to 
organize their polity according to their beliefs, while congregational forms of governance are permitted 
to do so.”). 
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010). 
224. Id. § 57-9(B). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. See § 57-9(A) (omitting a reference to a church’s constitution, practices, or customs). 
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regards to property ownership, Section 57-9(A) allows local congregational 
majorities to determine ownership of church property if the factual 
prerequisites identified in the statute are present.
229
  Thus, certain 
hierarchical churches are placed in a position of having to reconfigure their 
internal structure so they will fall outside Section 57-9(A)—for example, 
rewriting their constitutions so that church property is titled in the name of 
an ecclesiastical officer as opposed to being held in trust for the church by a 
local congregation—or risk having their internal policies ignored and losing 
their property to a dissident congregation.
230
  Section 57-9(B) does not 
place a similar burden to restructure on congregational churches.
231
 
Section 57-9’s disparate treatment between different forms of 
hierarchical churches and between hierarchical churches and congregational 
churches renders the statute constitutionally suspect.
232
  This conclusion is 
supported by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Larson v. Valente.
233
  That 
case involved a statute that required charitable organizations to register and 
file “extensive annual reports” with the state.
234
  However, if a religious 
organization received more than half of its total contributions from 
members or affiliates, it would be exempted from the burdens imposed by 
the statute.
235
  Thus, the statute was “not simply a facially neutral statute, 
the provisions of which happen to have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different 
religious organizations.”
236
  Rather, the language of the statute made 
“explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious 
organizations.”237  The Court explained that “when we are presented with a 
state law granting denominational preference, our precedents demand that 
we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its 
constitutionality.”
238
  Ultimately, the Court invalidated the statute on the 
ground that the “fifty percent rule” unconstitutionally discriminated among 
religious groups.
239
 
 
 
 
229. Id. 
230. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 457–58. 
231. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885. 
232. Id. at 1885–86. 
233. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
234. Id. at 231. 
235. Id. at 231–32. 
236. Id. at 247 n.23. 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 246. 
239. Id. at 255. 
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Similar to the “fifty percent” statute in Larson, Section 57-9 is not a 
facially neutral statute that, in operation, has a disparate impact on certain 
religious organizations.
240
  Rather, the language of the statute makes 
“explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious 
organizations.”241  Accordingly, the Court’s analysis in Larson indicates 
that Section 57-9(A) would need to survive strict scrutiny analysis to pass 
constitutional muster.
242
  Strict scrutiny analysis, “which usually sounds the 
death knell for constitutionally suspect laws,”
243
 requires a law be 
invalidated “unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest” 
and the law is “closely fitted to further that interest.”
244
  While the state has 
a compelling interest in resolving religious property disputes, “[t]he state 
has no compelling interest in restricting the set of legally cognizable forms 
for determining property rights within religious institutions.”
245
  
Furthermore, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve its putative 
government interest.  The government may achieve its interest in resolving 
religious property disputes in a manner that does not draw the courts into 
the ecclesiastical thicket without “imposing a rule of congregational 
majority on hierarchical churches, even when a hierarchical church has 
already created a rule of decision for resolving property disputes in a legally 
cognizable form.”246  Indeed, a statute codifying the “deference rule,” where 
applicable, would be far more narrowly tailored to achieve the same interest 
in that the statute would not impose a congregational form of property 
dispute resolution on hierarchical churches or vice versa.  Ultimately, the 
fact that Section 57-9(A) discriminates against certain religious bodies far 
more than is necessary to achieve its putative compelling government 
interest makes it unlikely that a court would find that it passes strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
 
  
 
240. Id. at 247 n.23. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 229. 
243. Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (W.D. Va. 2002). 
244. Larson, 456 U.S. at 247. 
245. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1886. 
246. Id. (citations omitted). 
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B.  Free Exercise Clause
247
 
1.  Section 57-9(A) as a Neutral Principle of Law 
Section 57-9(A), if categorized as a neutral principle of law, raises 
notable free exercise issues.
248
  The Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the 
free exercise [of religion].”
249
  The First Amendment’s prohibition on 
government with the free exercise of religion is also binding on state 
governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, a similar 
provision appears in the Virginia Constitution, which provides that “all men 
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates 
of conscience.”250  Religious institutions, like individuals, have free 
exercise rights under the First Amendment.
251
  According to Justice 
Brennan, “[r]eligion includes important communal elements for most 
believers.  They exercise their religion through religious organizations, and 
these organizations must be protected [by the Free Exercise Clause].”
252
  
Thus, in order for any statute in Virginia to pass constitutional muster, it 
must not impermissibly impede on a religious institution’s free exercise 
rights. 
Of the three approaches that civil courts may use to resolve religious 
property disputes—the deference approach, the neutral principles approach, 
and the special statute approach—Section 57-9(A) could only arguably be 
considered as either a neutral principle of law or special statute.  Indeed, it 
is necessary to evaluate  Section 57-9(A) under the known standards of each 
potential category because it remains unclear whether there is any 
difference between the “neutral principles of law” approach as opposed to 
the “special statutes” approach.
 253
  If the two are categorically different, 
Section 57-9(A) is more likely to be considered the latter over the former.  
Given the ambiguity of the law in this area, however, it is worth considering  
 
 
 
247. For an excellent discussion on the free exercise implications posed by Section 57-9(A), see 
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1855–91. 
248. See Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 450–51; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1880–84. 
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I (alteration in original). 
250. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
251. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979). 
252. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 443 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
253. Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986). 
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whether a party could argue and establish that Section 57-9(A) is a neutral 
principle of law that does not violate the free exercise rights of the religious 
institutions it regulates—namely, hierarchical churches.
254
 
A neutral principle of law, by design, “is completely secular in 
operation” and “promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement 
in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”
255
  Furthermore, it is 
a principle of law “flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious 
organization and polity.”256  One might argue that Section 57-9(A) is a 
neutral principle of law in that it operates as a presumptive rule of majority 
representation.  This rule acts as a legal assumption that “a voluntary 
religious association is represented by a majority of its members.”
257
  Thus, 
when competing factions of a religious dispute both claim to be the 
congregation entitled to possess and use church property, the court would 
determine which faction was the majority faction and presume that faction 
is one that represents the church.
258
  However, the issue of majority 
representation as it relates to the local church only becomes germane once it 
has been determined that the property should remain with the local church, 
as opposed to remaining with the parent church or religious society.
259
  The 
Supreme Court stated that a presumption of majority representation may be 
constitutional if it is “defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the 
local church is to be determined by some other means.”
260
  In other words, 
“[s]uch a presumption is permissible after it has been determined that the 
property rights remain with a seceding local church and as long as the 
presumption can be overcome by certain provisions articulated by the 
Court.”
261
 
There is a colorable argument that Section 57-9(A) operates beyond 
constitutional boundaries as a presumptive rule of majority representation, 
as those boundaries are defined in Jones.  There, the Court unequivocally 
established that “any rule of majority representation can always be 
overcome” by a contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the 
church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying 
 
254. Religious institutions, like individuals, have free exercise rights under the First Amendment.  
Jones, 443 U.S. at 606. 
255. Id. at 603. 
256. Id. 
257. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1868. 
258. Id. at 1872. 
259. Id. 
260. These other “means” could include a provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the church’s 
constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying that the local church holds the property 
in trust for the parent church.  Jones, 443 U.S. at 607–08. 
261. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1872. 
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that the local church holds the property in trust for the parent church.
262
  
Such a holding is consistent with the notion that, as part of its free exercise 
rights, a religious institution has a right to govern its own internal 
structure—which includes configuring the manner in which church property 
is used, managed, and owned.263  However, Virginia’s statutory framework 
governing ownership of church property limits the manner in which a 
religious institution can overcome the presumption of majority control.  
Specifically, a hierarchical church may only overcome the presumption of 
majority control by “titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical 
officer of the general church or holding the property in corporate form.”
264
 
Virginia’s statutory framework, which limits the manner in which 
hierarchical churches may overcome the presumption of majority control 
created by Section 57-9(A), is constitutionally problematic.  One might 
argue that hierarchical churches are shortchanged in that they are not 
afforded the ability to “always” overcome Section 57-9(A)’s presumption 
of majority control by the methods outlined in Jones.  A fair reading of 
Jones supports two conclusions surrounding the constitutionality of a 
presumptive rule of majority representation: (a) a state may empower a 
religious institution to overcome a presumption of majority representation 
by any legally cognizable method; and (b) there are certain methods—a 
contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the church’s 
constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying that the 
local church holds the property in trust for the parent church—that will 
“always” overcome a presumption of majority representation.
265
  In other 
words, it is fair to read Jones as holding that—at a bare constitutional 
minimum—religious entities must be allowed to direct how their property is 
held by one of those three methods.
266
  The fact that they cannot do so 
under Virginia law could be perceived as an impermissible interference 
with a religious organization’s free exercise rights.267 
Admittedly, reasonable minds could differ as to the proper interpretation 
of the Court’s holding in Jones.  Some read Jones as supporting the position 
that a state need only provide an “escape hatch” for religious institutions to 
overcome the presumption of majority representation.
268
  Under this 
 
262. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added). 
263. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459. 
264. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1872–73 (demonstrating how Section 57-9 is inconsistent with Jones 
v. Wolf's holding that a hierarchical church must have a certain methods available to it to overcome a 
presumptive rule of majority representation). 
265. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607–08. 
266. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1874. 
267. Id. 
268. See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal II, 76 Va. Cir. 894, 923–24 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009). 
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reading, the three methods discussed by the Court for overcoming the 
presumptive rule of majority control—a contrary provision in a corporate 
charter, a provision in the church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of 
the property identifying that the local church holds the property in trust for 
the parent church— are not compulsory.269  Rather, the state need only 
provide some method of overcoming the rule that does not otherwise inhibit 
the institution’s free exercise rights or thrust the court into the ecclesiastical 
thicket.
270
  Proponents of this view focus on the Court’s statement that “the 
State may adopt any method of overcoming the majoritarian presumption, 
so long as the use of that method does not impair free-exercise rights or 
entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.”
271
  While the 
“escape hatch” view is consistent with this statement, it contradicts the 
court’s earlier statement a presumptive rule of majority representation “can 
always be overcome” by the three methods outlined above.  Accordingly, 
while the escape hatch method is a colorable reading of Jones that may 
prevent Section 57-9(A) from being found unconstitutional, such a reading 
is inconsistent with the context of the whole opinion and should be 
disfavored over reading Jones in a manner that reconciles the two 
statements.
272
  Such a reading perceives Jones as holding that: (a) a state 
may empower a religious institution to overcome a presumption of majority 
representation by any legally cognizable method; and (b) there are certain 
methods—a contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the 
church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying 
that the local church holds the property in trust for the parent church—that 
will “always” overcome a presumption of majority representation.
273
 
The issue of how Jones should be interpreted notwithstanding, another 
relevant free exercise question that must be considered is whether Section 
57-9(A) encroaches on the right of churches to develop its internal structure 
as it sees fit.  In electing to uphold the “neutral principles” doctrine over the 
objection of four dissenting justices, the Court explained that the 
constitutionality of the doctrine depended on its proper application to 
religious organizations.  Specifically, it stated: 
Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property 
dispute is not foreordained.  At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties 
can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church 
will retain the church property.  They can modify the deeds or the corporate 
 
269. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873. 
270. Id. 
271. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979). 
272. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1875. 
273. Id. 
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charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church.  
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an 
express trust in favor of the denominational church.  The burden involved in 
taking such steps will be minimal.  And the civil courts will be bound to give 
effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some 
legally cognizable form.
274
 
This language suggests that the Court’s basis for finding the doctrine of 
neutral principles constitutional was the flexibility of the doctrine enabling 
the governing bodies of hierarchical churches to “ensure... that the faction 
loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.”
275
  Indeed, 
the Court places the burden on religious institutions to “structure 
relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts 
to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”
276
  The relevant question is whether 
state governments can dictate how a religious institution must structure its 
relationship in this regard.  For example, the Episcopal Church had 
numerous canons in place to ensure that, in the event of property dispute, 
the property at issue would remain under the control of the of TEC, the 
Diocese, and the congregational faction loyal to TEC.
277
  However, Virginia 
only allows a hierarchical church to overcome the presumption of majority 
control by “titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer of the 
general church or holding the property in corporate form”—a structural 
measure not provided for in TEC’s canons and constitution.
278
 
These limitations seem at odds with the scope of choice religious 
institutions were supposed to be offered in order to preserve the 
constitutionality of neutral principles of law being a viable solution to 
resolving church property disputes.
279
  Specifically, the Court clearly stated 
religious institutions must be given the opportunity to ensure “that the 
faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property” by 
 
274. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added); see also Hassler, supra note 22, at 430–31 (noting that 
one of the benefits to the neutral principles approach is flexibility). 
275. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606. 
276. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
277. Canon II.6(1) requires property dedicated for worship or other ministry to “secured for ownership 
and use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation, or Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its 
Constitution and Canons.”  CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 160, at 64.  Canon II.6(2) establishes 
that a congregation may not alienate or encumber church property without the consent of the respective 
Diocese that oversees the congregation.  Id. Additionally, Diocesan Canon 15.1 provides that “[a]ll real 
and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Church or Mission . . . is held in trust for The 
Episcopal Church and the Diocese.”  DIOCESAN CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 180, at 41. 
278. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873.  One distinctive feature of the TEC is that its structure calls for 
“lay involvement in [church] governance.”  Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 32.  According to 
TEC, to title the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer “would require the Diocese either to 
remove property authority from lay persons or somehow to restructure its polity to preserve lay 
involvement.  Id. 
279. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 460–61. 
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configuring its property holdings in “some legally cognizable form.”
280 
 The 
Court did not limit the ability of religious organizations to exercise this 
right according to a narrow and specific set of options, or only those options 
provided for by a state’s statutory framework.
281
  Rather, the Court 
deliberately used broad language, giving hierarchical religious 
organizations the ability to structure its property holdings in “some” legally 
cognizable form.
282
  Allowing religious organizations this broad range of 
decision-making makes sense because a constitutional neutral principle of 
law, by its very definition, is one that must be “flexible enough to 
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.”
283
  Certain 
hierarchical churches, such as TEC, structure their property holdings in a 
legally cognizable form—such as having its property held in trust by local 
parishes—but still remain at risk of a disloyal faction retaining control of 
the property because of Section 57-9(A).284  Thus, Section 57-9(A) falls 
well short of being flexible enough to accommodate “all forms” of church 
government.
285
  Indeed, hierarchical churches that configure their 
government in a manner similar to TEC must restructure to accommodate 
Section 57-9(A) or remain at risk of losing significant church property.
286
  
Placing hierarchical churches in this sort of dilemma is a far cry from the 
sort of flexibility envisioned by the Court when discussing the 
constitutionality of applying neutral principles of law to resolve church 
property disputes.
287
 
It may very well be that the Court stressed the need for neutral principles 
of law to be flexible enough to accommodate all forms of government 
because it realized to hold otherwise and craft a rule of law that required 
churches to reorganize their internal structures would unduly inhibit those 
churches’ free exercise rights.  Indeed, the manner in which a hierarchical 
church structures itself—included in which is the manner in which the 
church manages its property—seems to be purely ecclesiastical in nature.
288
  
The Supreme Court confirmed this position when it stated religious 
freedom encompasses the “power [of religious organizations] to decide for 
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as 
 
280. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added). 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Id. at 603 (emphasis added). 
284. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 458–59. 
285. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1876. 
286. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459. 
287. Id. at 458–59. 
288. Id. at 459 (noting that a church’s internal governing structure and property ownership system are 
doctrinal in nature). 
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well as those of faith and doctrine.” 
289
  Likewise, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia also acknowledged that the manner in which a religious 
organization crafts its internal governing structure—particularly, in 
hierarchical churches—is wholly doctrinal in nature. 
290
  These “issues of 
church governance... [are] unquestionably outside the jurisdiction of the 
civil courts.”
291
 
In summary, Section 57-9(A) fails to be a viable neutral principle of law 
that the courts may rely on to resolve church property disputes for the 
reasons set above.  Specifically, hierarchical religious organizations are 
unconstitutionally limited in the manner by which they can overcome a 
presumptive rule of majority representation and by the way they can 
configure their own internal structures to ensure that, in the event of a 
schism within the church, the faction loyal to the hierarchy can maintain 
control over church property.292  Furthermore, not only does the statute 
enable any congregation that leaves a hierarchical church to overcome its 
original contractual agreement to be subject to the canons and constitutions 
of that church,
293
 the statute ignores the reality that “[r]espect for the First 
Amendment free exercise rights of persons to enter into a religious 
association of their choice... requires civil courts to give effect to the 
provisions and agreements of that religious association.”
294
  Accordingly, if 
Section 57-9(A) is to pass constitutional muster, it must do so as a special 
statute. 
 
  
 
289. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (alteration in original). 
290. Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 189, 327 S.E.2d 107, 113 (1985) (citing Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976); Green v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 549 272 S.E.2d 181, 181–82 
(1980)). 
291. Bowie v. Murphy, 271 Va. 126, 133, 624 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2006) (citing Reid, 229 Va. at 187, 327 
S.E.2d at 111–12). 
292. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 458–59; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1875 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 
443 U.S. 595, 600–01, 604 (1979)).  Indeed, several statutes similar to Section 57-9(A) have been struck 
down as unconstitutional.  See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 104 (S.D. Ala. 
1966) (finding a statute unconstitutional that allowed sixty-five percent of a local church in 
disagreement with a parent church to separate from the parent church and retain control over church 
property); Sustar v. Williams, 263 So. 2d 537, 543 (Miss. 1972) (finding a statute unconstitutional that 
allowed a two-thirds majority of congregation to obtain control and authority over trust property when a 
schism occurred between beneficiaries and church authorities). 
293. Wallace v. Hughes, 131 Ky. 445, 469–70, 115 S.W. 684, 691 (1909) (explaining that “religious 
organizations are merely voluntary associations, whose constitutions and laws are in their ultimate 
result, so far as the civil tribunals are concerned, in the nature of contracts between the members”). 
294. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 489, 198 P.3d 66, 82 (2009). 
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2.  Section 57-9(A) as a Special Statute 
Another method of approaching Section 57-9(A) is to categorize it as a 
special statute that governs “church property arrangements in a manner that 
precludes state interference in doctrine.”
295
  As noted above, there is no 
Supreme Court opinion setting aside special statutes as a third constitutional 
approach for resolving church property disputes.
296
  The precedential origin 
for this approach is a concurring opinion written by Justice Brennan in 
Churches of God. 
297
 Some commentators argue the concept of special 
statutes as a third approach to resolving church property disputes is moot as 
a result of subsequent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence since 
that case.
298
  Accordingly, courts remain unclear as to whether special 
statutes are a separate approach for resolving church property disputes unto 
themselves or a subcategory of neutral principles of law.299  As a result, 
there is no clear standard—if special statutes are categorically different than 
neutral principles of law—as to how they must be crafted to satisfy First 
Amendment requirements.
300
  The clearest guidance available in this respect 
is found in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Churches of God.
301
  
Justice Brennan explained that for such statutes to be constitutional, they 
“must be carefully drawn to leave control of ecclesiastical policy, as well as 
doctrine, to church governing bodies.”
302
 
Per the Supreme Court of Virginia’s holding in Truro, a congregation of 
a hierarchical church may divest the church of its property rights if it 
establishes: (a) that a division occurred within the hierarchical church; (b) 
the congregation was attached to the church at the time of the division; (c) 
the congregation separated from the church and voted to align itself with a 
“branch” of the church that experienced the division.
303
  It is important to 
 
295. Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
296. See supra Part I.   
297. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
298. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1887.  McCarthy explains that: 
The concurrence was written prior to the Court's statement in Jones v. Wolf that tied the 
protection of free exercise rights to “neutral provisions of state law governing the manner 
in which churches own property.”  It was also written prior to Employment Division v. 
Smith, an opinion that substantially altered the Court's approach to the Free Exercise 
Clause. Finally, Justice Brennan's statement does not necessarily sanction treating 
religious and secular voluntary associations differently, nor does it suggest that a state 
might distinguish between denominations. 
      Id. (internal citations omitted). 
299. Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986). 
300. Id. 
301. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
302. Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nichols Cathedral.  344 U.S. 94 (1952)). 
303. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 21-22, 694 S.E.2d 555, 563 (2010) 
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note that the “division” need not occur in accordance with church polity and 
the “branch” need not operate under the same polity.
304
  Thus, Section 57-
9(A) strips governing bodies of hierarchical churches of control over 
matters of ecclesiastical policy and doctrine.
305
  Namely, the statute divests 
the governing body of hierarchical churches of the ability to configure their 
own structure without facing a very real risk of losing significant church 
property to a dissident congregation.
306
  Accordingly, Section 57-9(A) does 
not meet the requirement of being “carefully drawn to leave control of 
ecclesiastical policy, as well as doctrine, to church governing bodies.”
307
 
Indeed, the manner in which a church arranges for its property to be held 
is a central issue to the church’s internal structure.
308
  The Court’s reasoning 
in Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral supports this conclusion.
309
  In that 
case, the Court invalidated a statute purporting to transfer control of church 
property from one hierarchical religious entity to another hierarchical 
religious entity.
 310
  In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court 
explained “the right conferred under canon law... to [use and occupy church 
property] was ‘strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government,’ and... could 
not constitutionally be impaired by a statute purporting to bestow that right 
on another.”
311
  Thus, even as a special statute, Section 57-9(A) 
unconstitutionally invades the province of religious governing bodies 
because “the reorganization of [a hierarchical religious body] involves a 
matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical 
affairs.”
312
 
Section 57-9’s encroachment on structural control that is properly left to 
the governing bodies of hierarchical religious institutions seems to stray 
outside what the First Amendment will tolerate of any special statute.  
Kedroff is illustrative of this principle.
313
  That case involved a statute that 
purported to divest the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
Moscow of its control over local churches in the United States.  
Furthermore, the statute transferred vested control over the local churches 
from the governing body of the church in Russia to the governing 
 
304. Id. at 26, 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 556, 567. 
305. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 457–58. 
306. Id. at 458–59. 
307. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
308. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459. 
309. 363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960). 
310. Id. at 190–91. 
311. Id. 
312. Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976). 
313. 344 U.S. at 94.  For a complete discussion of this issue, see McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1887–88. 
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authorities located stateside.
314
  The Court explained that the statute 
operated to pass “control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church 
authority to another.  It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a 
church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom 
contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.”315  In other words, the 
Court held that religious bodies are constitutionally entitled to freely 
exercise their religious beliefs in regards to their own structure, 
administration, and operation.
316
  The First Amendment requires that these 
institutions be allowed to decide for themselves how they will resolve 
matters of church government, faith, and doctrine without interference from 
the state.
317
  Even when viewed as a special statute specifically meant to 
address church property disputes, Section 57-9(A) impermissibly divests 
the governing bodies of religious institutions of “control of ecclesiastical 
policy” in violation of the First Amendment.
318
 
 
C.  Navigating the Ecclesiastical Collision in the Future 
If there is one thing that Truro did make clear, it is that Section 57-9(A) 
is not the only principle of law Virginia courts may turn to in attempting to 
resolve a hierarchical church property dispute.
319
  Indeed, the court 
established that such disputes may be resolved by use of contract and 
property law.320  Accordingly, it is possible that future church disputes 
litigated in Virginia courts may run their course without triggering the 
statute.  Rather a court may find the statute inapplicable for one of several 
reasons and then turn to contract and property to law as the controlling 
doctrines in the case.
321
  To illustrate this point, a Virginia court confronted 
 
314. 344 U.S. at 119. 
315. Id. at 119. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
319. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 29, 694 S.E.2d 555, 567 (2010); Chambers & McBeth, supra note 151, at 150, 
166–67. 
320. Truro, 280 Va. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567; Chambers & McBeth, supra note 151, at 146, 150, 161. 
321. Truro, 280 Va. at 21–22, 694 S.E.2d at 563.  The court established the following factual 
prerequisites that a congregation must establish to avoid itself of Section 57-9(A): 
There has been a “division . . . in a church or religious society to which any such 
congregation . . . is attached.”  Likewise, the authority afforded by the statute permitting 
such congregations to vote in order to determine “to which branch of the church or 
society such congregation shall thereafter belong” must be construed within the context 
of the first phrase of the statute.  That is, the “branch of the church or society” to which 
the congregation votes to belong must be a branch of the “church or religious society to 
which [the petitioning congregation] is attached” prior to the “division.” 
Id.  If a congregation failed to establish one of these elements, a court could find the statute inapplicable 
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with a hierarchical church property dispute should follow the analytical 
model set forth in Truro and first attempt to apply Section 57-9(A).
322
  If the 
court finds the statute inapplicable, it should next turn to neutral principles 
of law—such as property law and contract law—as the law governing the 
outcome of the case.
323
  If applying neutral principles of law implicates 
ecclesiastical questions, the court should then defer to the outcome 
proposed by the adjudicatory body of the hierarchical church involved.
324
 
Not every possible application of Section 57-9(A) to hierarchical church 
property disputes will trigger all of the constitutional issues that were 
identified in Part III.
325
  One constitutional issue that will always be present 
when applying the statute is whether the court can determine whether one 
church is a branch of another church without becoming enmeshed in the 
ecclesiastical thicket.
326
  Going forward, the most constitutionally 
problematic scenario is one in which a congregation separates from a parent 
church and realigns itself with a branch of the parent church that is not 
subject to the governing body of the parent church.  This scenario is 
completely plausible given that the Supreme Court of Virginia held that 
operation as a separate polity would not necessarily bar a given religious 
organization from qualifying as a branch of a church or religious society 
that experienced division.327  A successful Section 57-9(A) petition under 
this fact pattern would strip one hierarchical church of its property rights 
and redistribute those rights to a completely different religious organization.  
This scenario would open the door for the hierarchical church deprived of 
its property to argue that Section 57-9 violates the requirement of 
government neutrality towards religion by operating as a government 
preference for congregational churches and by inhibiting the hierarchical 
church’s free exercise rights to structure its property holdings in a manner 
that, but for the statute, would legally ensure that the faction loyal to the 
church retained control of the property.
328
 
 
 
and defer to property law and contract law as the court in Truro did.  See id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
322. Truro, 280 Va. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611 
S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)). 
323. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)). 
324. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726-27 (1871). 
325. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
326. See supra Part III.A. 
327. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567. 
328. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (stating that the principle of government 
neutrality towards religion is at the heart of the Establishment Clause); Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 
(explaining that the neutral principles of law doctrine does not implicate free exercise issues because a 
hierarchical church will be able to ensure the faction loyal to the church because civil courts are bound 
to give effect to any such arrangement made in some legally cognizable form); see supra Part III.A–B. 
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In the event that a court is called upon to apply Section 57-9(A) in such a 
scenario, it may be able to avoid some of the statute’s constitutional 
infirmities by categorizing Section 57-9(A) as a neutral principle of law—
specifically, a presumptive rule of majority representation—and interpreting 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones as merely requiring states to provide 
an “escape hatch” for hierarchical churches to ensure they can overcome the 
presumptive rule of majority representation.329  Such an interpretation 
would arguably enable a court to justify holding the statute constitutional by 
resolving free exercise concerns surrounding the statute.  Namely, the 
“escape hatch” reading of Jones provides that a hierarchical church’s free 
exercise rights are not violated by the application of the presumptive rule of 
majority representation as long as there is some method to overcome the 
presumption.
330
  Given that Virginia allows hierarchical churches to avoid 
the application of Section 57-9(A)’s presumptive rule of majority 
representation in a property dispute by titling the property in the name of an 
ecclesiastical officer,
331
 a court could hold a sufficient “escape hatch” exists 
to find the statute constitutional.
332
  Indeed, the circuit court in Truro used a 
similar reasoning in response to TEC and the Diocese’s constitutional 
challenges of Section 57-9(A).
333
 
Ultimately, however, courts should not find Section 57-9 to be 
constitutional for several reasons. First, evaluating whether one church is 
sufficiently derived from another so as to qualify the former as a branch of 
the latter raises Establishment Clause concerns by requiring the court to 
examine prior religious affiliations between the two entities.  Such an 
analysis is likely to place the court in a position necessitating the 
interpretation of religious canons that govern such relationships.  
Additionally, Section 57-9 violates the principle of government neutrality 
towards all forms of religion.  Section 57-9(B) expressly applies to 
congregational churches because it only applies to a church “entirely 
independent of any other church or general society.”  Section 57-9(A), by 
practical implication of 57-9(B)’s language, governs church property 
disputes in hierarchical churches—those churches not governed that are not 
“entirely independent of any other church or general society.”  The former 
defers to the property dispute resolution procedures of a congregational 
church, while the latter ignores a hierarchical church’s property dispute 
resolution procedures and imposes a rule of congregational majority vote on 
 
329. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873. 
330. See supra text accompanying notes 269–74. 
331. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
332. Id. 
333. See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal II, 76 Va. Cir. 894, 923–24 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009). 
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hierarchical churches.  As to the “escape hatch” reading of Jones—the 
reading necessary to prevent Section 57-9(A) from violating a hierarchical 
church’s free exercise rights—such a reading views one statement of the 
opinion out of context and renders the majority opinion inconsistent.
334
  
Furthermore, even if the “escape hatch” reading of Jones were correct, 
Section 57-9(A) lacks sufficient flexibility towards all forms of religious 
government to qualify as a constitutional neutral principle of law that can 
be applied to resolve church property disputes.335  Admittedly, it is well 
settled that statutes should be interpreted and applied so as to preserve their 
constitutionality.
336
  This rule of statutory interpretation notwithstanding, 
courts should not go to extreme or extraordinary lengths to apply Section 
57-9(A) in whatever way best preserves constitutionality.
337
  Rather, the 
Virginia courts should welcome the coming ecclesiastical collision as an 
opportunity to purge the Virginia Code of a statute that is not consistent 
with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Church property disputes are rife with lurking ecclesiastical issues that 
are outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts.338  Churches are being forced 
to wrestle with difficult doctrinal questions because of trending changes in 
the overall political temperament of the general United States’ 
population.
339
  Accordingly, the internal disputes within a religious 
organization that arise from church leadership revisiting and changing 
positions on issues such as homosexual marriage and ordainment of 
homosexual ministers are only expected to increase in the future.
340
  An 
increase in such disputes will also cause an increase in church property 
litigation as more congregations splinter.  This Article examined the  
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constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may 
pursue to resolve these types of property disputes and provided a specific 
analysis on Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so.
341
 
The law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path 
leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision.  While that collision will 
likely occur sooner than later, it is not a question of “if,” it is only a 
question of “when.”  The wreckage that follows the collision may bring one 
of several potential changes to the law.  The General Assembly may attempt 
to draft a new statute to govern hierarchical churches that falls within 
constitutional boundaries or the courts may simply turn to neutral principles 
of law—such as contract and property law—from that day forward.342  It is 
also possible—albeit unlikely, given there is no strong history of this 
practice in Virginia—that courts will more frequently defer to the internal 
adjudication of such disputes so as to avoid another ecclesiastical 
collision.
343
 
Ultimately, Section 57-9 will not survive the coming collision.  Although 
it is interesting to speculate what form Virginia law governing church 
property disputes will take from the post-collision wreckage, this is a 
question that can only be answered in time.  In the end, however, Virginia 
will only gain from this change in the law.  Portions of the Virginia Code 
not in accordance with the U.S. Constitution will be put to rest, and courts 
will be empowered to resolve church property disputes because the 
difference between a church property dispute and any other property dispute 
will no longer exist.  Instead, courts will be guided by uniform legal 
principles that are applicable in any property dispute.  The fact that Virginia 
is on the road to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision is not something to 
be feared.  Rather, it is something to be appreciated as it brings with it new 
and exciting developments to Virginia law. 
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